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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation consists of three empirical essays on the distributional effect of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on regional economic activity, migration and the 
distribution of wages in Mexico from 1980 to 2010. 
In the first essay, we use municipal level data from the Mexican Population and Economic 
censuses to explain the regional distribution of the benefits from trade in Mexico after the NAFTA. 
To explicitly identify the effect of the trade agreement, we compare results for growth in traded and 
non-traded sectors. Given the spatial nature of these data, we also make explicit use of spatial 
econometrics methods. We find that NAFTA caused the wealthy regions nearest to the border to 
grow faster than others, increasing regional disparity. To confirm that these changes are attributed to 
NAFTA and not to any other temporal factor, we divided the data by sectors, and found that the 
trade sector (manufacturing) is affected more strongly by the pull on the northern-border region. 
In the second essay, I use data from the Mexican Economic and Population censuses to study the 
effects of trade liberalization on internal-migration patterns in Mexico. Using a gravity model of 
migration, I find that while economic growth from trade openness did draw workers to urban 
regions in the northern Border States of Mexico, much of the trade-driven migration occurred 
before NAFTA. I also find evidence that migration to the United States increased after NAFTA.  
Last, I find that income disparity deters migration and that this effect increases after NAFTA.  Thus, 
I see evidence that within-region income disparity can hinder migration, potentially exacerbating 
income disparity among regions. 
In the third essay, I use micro data from the Mexican Population Census and data from the 
Mexican Economic Census on individual level wages, individual and household characteristics, as 
well as regional level data in terms of economic growth, education, migration, and other 
characteristics, to determine regional income disparities throughout each Mexican region. I 
specifically consider rural to urban migration and find that working age men with low incomes get a 
boost from the NAFTA in their wages while NAFTA has a negative effect for those with high 
incomes. There is a slight increase in migration in the years after NAFTA. I also find that, workers 
far away from the US-Mexico border earn significantly lower wages in comparison to their 
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counterparts in the border. But this effect diminishes after NAFTA, when tariffs decrease.  As a 
result, I find that in urban areas, trade liberalization has reduced income inequalities among working 
age men. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the 1980s Mexico abandoned its Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies and 
opened its economy to international trade and capital flows, especially with its northern neighbor, 
the United States. This change in trade policy was intended to increase economic growth by 
improving the competitiveness of Mexican exports and attracting foreign investment. Despite these 
potential benefits, concerns have emerged about the distribution of the gains from trade 
liberalization. One group of researchers has shown that the effect of these reforms is far from 
uniform across all regions of Mexico, while others show these benefits spreading across the country. 
The distribution of benefits from trade is particularly important in Mexico given its pre-existing high 
levels of regional inequality.  In this dissertation, I use novel data and econometric techniques to 
study the distributional effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on regional 
economic activity and the distribution of wages. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the consequences of international trade in different 
regions and sectors of Mexico. First, I study the extent to which NAFTA resulted in an increase in 
regional disparities in Gross Value Added (GVA). Specifically I investigate the effect of trade on 
different sectors, in an attempt to disentangle this effect versus other economic growth. Second, I 
ask how trade openness has influenced internal migration patterns across Mexico. Finally I explore 
how NAFTA affected the distribution of wages in Mexico when including the effect of internal 
migration induced by trade. Thus, my dissertation studies how three of the main mechanisms of 
international integration (trade of goods, capital flow and movements of labor supply) influenced 
regional and individual inequalities. 
The first essay, coauthored with Kathy Baylis and Gianfranco Piras, studies the regional 
distribution of gains from trade in Mexico after the NAFTA. The NAFTA was expected to benefit 
primarily the wealthier northern states of Mexico due to their proximity to the U.S. market. Standard 
trade theory might predict that given Mexico's relative abundance of low-skilled labor; poorer 
regions with large pools of unskilled labor benefit more from the trade agreement. In this chapter, 
we study the distributional effects of NAFTA throughout Mexico. Specifically, we ask whether or 
not NAFTA has increased the concentration of economic activity in Mexico.  
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Little empirical work exists looking at whether NAFTA made regional disparity worse or better, 
and what there is produces mixed results (Aroca, et al., 2005; Krugman, et al., 1996; Hanson, 2001; 
Rodriguez-Pose, et al., 2005). In contrast to prior work which uses state-level data, we identify the 
effect of NAFTA on economic activity at the municipal level allowing observation of detailed 
growth patterns across space. Furthermore, to explicitly identify the effect of the trade agreement, 
we compare results for growth in traded and non-traded sectors. Given the spatial nature of these 
data, we make explicit use of spatial econometrics methods.  
We find that NAFTA caused the wealthy regions nearest to the border to grow faster than 
others, increasing regional disparity. Also, larger municipalities experienced greater per-capita 
economic benefits from NAFTA. This effect is particularly noticeable in the north. To confirm that 
these changes are attributed to NAFTA and not to any other temporal factor, we divided the data by 
sectors, and discovered that the trade sector (manufacturing) is affected more strongly by the pull on 
the northern-border region. That said, in the non-traded sectors, regions with a smaller portion of 
high-school graduates and worse infrastructure saw their growth increase after the trade agreement, 
decreasing regional disparity. As expected, a substantial spatial correlation was found in the level of 
municipal economic activity and their economic growth rates.  
The second essay studies how internal migration responds to trade openness. I seek to answer the 
following questions: Has trade liberalization changed the pattern of internal migration? What 
characteristics facilitate or hinder that internal migration? Using a gravity model of migration, I find 
that while economic growth from trade openness did draw workers to urban regions in the northern 
Border States of Mexico, much of the trade-driven migration occurred before NAFTA. I also find 
evidence that migration to the United States increased after NAFTA.  Last, I find that income 
disparity deters migration and that this effect increases after NAFTA.  Thus, I see evidence that 
within-region income disparity can hinder migration, potentially exacerbating income disparity 
among regions. 
The third essay studies how NAFTA affected income distribution within Mexico given internal 
migration. In low-skilled labor-abundant developing countries, trade liberalization should 
theoretically increase the income of low-skilled workers, decreasing income disparity.  However, 
anecdotal evidence indicates that NAFTA increased the gap between rich and poor in Mexico, and 
empirical evidence is mixed (Chiquiar, Why Mexico’s regional income convergence broke down, 
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2005; Nicita, The price effect of tariff liberalization: Measuring the impact on household welfare, 
2009; Hanson G. H., Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in Mexico, 2007).  Because trade 
may affect wages differently across regions within the country, accurate measures of wage effects 
must incorporate intra-national migration. I specifically consider rural to urban migration and find 
that working age men with low incomes get a boost from the NAFTA in their wages while NAFTA 
has a negative effect for those with high incomes. There is a slight increase in migration in the years 
after NAFTA. I also find that, workers far away from the US-Mexico border earn significantly lower 
wages in comparison to their counterparts in the border. But this effect diminishes after NAFTA, 
when tariffs decrease.  As a result, I find that in urban areas, trade liberalization has reduced income 
inequalities among working age men. 
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2. THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF NAFTA IN MEXICO: EVIDENCE 
FROM A PANEL OF MUNICIPALITIES  
2.1. Introduction 
 
Trade not only affects the overall economic growth in a country, it also affects the location of 
that economic activity (Behrens et al. 2007, Krugman 1991, Hanson 1998a). Particularly for a 
country with great geographic disparity, such as Mexico, the distributional effects of trade may be at 
least as important as the overall effect. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was 
expected to primarily benefit the wealthier northern states of Mexico due to their proximity to the 
U.S. market. Standard trade theory might predict that given Mexico's relative abundance of low-
skilled labor, poorer regions with large pools of unskilled labor might benefit more from the trade 
agreement. In this chapter, we study the distributional effects of NAFTA throughout Mexico. 
Specifically, we ask whether NAFTA increased the concentration of economic activity in Mexico. 
Mexico has one of the highest rates of income inequality in the world, and there are concerns that 
NAFTA has made it worse (OECD, 2008). For example Robertson (2000) and Chiquiar (2008) find 
that international trade has primarily increased wages in northern states. A recent World Bank report 
argues that NAFTA did not benefit the poorer South due to insufficient infrastructure, social 
instability and governance (Esquivel, Lederman, Messmacher, & Villoro, 2002). With a few 
exceptions, there is little empirical work looking at whether NAFTA made regional disparity worse 
or better, and what there is produces mixed results (Aroca, et al., 2005; Krugman, et al., 1996; 
Hanson, 2001; Rodriguez-Pose, et al., 2005). Since NAFTA was one of the early bilateral trade 
agreements to link a developing country to a large developed economy, its effects may shed light on 
the other bilateral trade agreements currently under negotiation. Further, understanding what 
characteristics limited a region's ability to benefit from trade might facilitate the development of 
programs to give regions better access to the new export market, or, at a minimum, might allow for 
targeted compensation. 
The few empirical studies that have explicitly analyzed the geographic effect of NAFTA on 
economic activity in Mexico are limited by using state level data, which masks the spatial distribution 
of economic activity and severely restricts their number of observations. We believe this chapter 
offers the following four contributions. First, we use municipal panel data to identify the 
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relationship between trade and regional patterns of growth, which both greatly increases our ability 
to observe geographic patterns as well as simply increasing the number of observations. Second, by 
separating economic activity into traded and non-traded goods, we can better identify the specific 
effect of trade. Third, we include the latest economic census (2004) to observe longer-term effects 
of NAFTA. Last, we explicitly control for the spatial nature of our data, and use newly-developed 
spatial panel data methods (Kapoor & Prucha, 2007)1. 
We find that NAFTA has increased the concentration of economic activity in Mexico. The 
output of regions near the border grows faster than those regions further from the United States 
after NAFTA, even when these border regions already had high levels of economic activity before 
the trade agreement. Second, we find that the benefits of NAFTA went disproportionately to 
densely-populated regions. This effect is particularly notable for cities in the north. That said, 
NAFTA may have had some redistributive effects. As might be predicted by a standard Heckscher-
Ohlin model, we find that those regions with lower rates of high school, located primarily in the 
south, benefit more from NAFTA. Similarly, regions with lower levels of infrastructure began to 
grow more quickly after NAFTA, implying a redistributive effect of these economic changes. 
To determine whether we can truly attribute these changes to NAFTA as opposed to other 
temporal effects, we split the data by sector. We observe that the traded sector, manufacturing, is 
affected most strongly by the pull of the border after NAFTA. For the non-traded sector, if 
anything we see a tendency to redistribute activity further away from the United States. Second, 
unlike the other sectors, we see more economic growth in the service sector in those municipalities 
with lower literacy rates after NAFTA. While overall, we find that the Mexican economy grew more 
slowly after NAFTA, notably the traded sectors fared better in terms of economic levels and growth 
rates after the trade agreement than the non-traded sectors. As expected, we find substantial spatial 
correlation in the level of municipal economic activity and their economic growth rates. 
In the next section, we look at the regional distribution of economic activity before and after 
NAFTA. Next, we review New Economic Geography and trade literature that suggest which factors 
might affect this distribution. Then we present our empirical model, estimation technique and data. 
Results and conclusions end the chapter. 
 
                                                 
1 See Baltagi et al. (2007) for an application of this model to FDI. 
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2.2. Regional distribution of economic activity in Mexico 
 
Overall, Mexico has grown rich. Its $1.578 trillion economy is the world's eleventh-largest, up 
from fifteenth place 15 years ago. Trade volume has nearly tripled since the NAFTA, from $52 
billion to $161 billion in 2003, placing Mexico ahead of Britain, South Korea and Spain as a trading 
power (Smith, et al., 2003; Jordan, et al., 2003). Over the same time, the number of poor in Mexico 
has increased.2 Over half (54%) of the Mexican population is poor, and this proportion is unchanged 
since the early 1980s. Given the increase in population from 70 to 100 million over the same period, 
19 million more Mexicans are living in poverty than 20 years ago. More worrying, about 24 million 
people, nearly one in every four Mexicans, are classified as extremely poor and unable to afford 
adequate food (Jordan & Sullivan, 2003). Income inequality and poverty levels in Mexico remain the 
highest across the OECD. These poverty and income inequality levels are one and a half times 
higher than in a typical OECD country and twice as high as in low-inequality countries, such as 
Denmark (OECD 2008). Furthermore, most of those who are extremely poor live in rural areas. As 
a result between 400 to 600 people a day are packing up and migrating to cities or to the United 
States (Jordan & Sullivan, 2003). The situation is even direr for those families who are not easily 
mobile, and the increasing income disparity has arguably led to social unrest (de Palma, 1996). 
Economic output varies sharply by region. Following Chiquiar (2008), we begin by dividing 
Mexico into 5 regions i) the Border Region, being states that border the United States; ii) the 
Northern Region, which includes states just south of the Border Region; iii) the Center; iv) the 
capital (Mexico City and surroundings); and v) the South (see Figure 1). Figure 2 shows the Gross 
Value Added (GVA) in real pesos by region. Over the entire period, GVA in Mexico City is higher 
than in the other regions, with the northern non-border states and the south lagging behind. 
However, we see growth slowing in Mexico City after NAFTA, while other regions continue to 
expand. The growth of GVA before and after NAFTA is illustrated in Figure 3. The map showing 
growth from 1980-85 (panel a) illustrates that a larger number of regionally-diverse municipalities 
grew more than 100% before NAFTA. By contrast, in 1998 to 2003, high growth is more 
concentrated in clusters along the US-Mexico Border (panel b). Some of the clusters that can be 
seen in the post-NAFTA map are Chihuahua, Saltillo, and Monterrey. One can clearly identify the 
areas of low growth in the south and more rapid growth in the north. Note that these maps also 
                                                 
2 According to Jordan, et al.(2003) poor are those individuals unable to meet basic needs. 
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indicate that growth is by no means homogenous within a state. Therefore, considering these data by 
municipality allows us to more accurately discern the patterns of economic activity. 
 
2.3. The location of economic activity after trade 
 
In this chapter, we ask: What is the distributional effect of NAFTA on Mexico? In particular, we 
are interested in whether NAFTA afforded poor regions economic opportunities, or whether the 
benefits are concentrated in those regions where economic growth was already robust. In the 1990s, 
a number of trade economists developed a theory explaining the location of economic activity, 
called the New Economic Geography (NEG).We briefly review NEG and its predictions about the 
location of economic activity, particularly after trade. Next, we present some possible implications of 
standard trade theory for the location of benefits from trade. We then use these theories to develop 
several hypotheses about how NAFTA may have changed the location of economic activity in 
Mexico. 
2.3.1. NEG Theory 
 
Agglomeration economies are positive externalities that induce the spatial concentration of 
economic activity, and these externalities can be affected by trade. Urban economic theory posits 
that firms obtain productive advantages from locating in close proximity to other firms and these 
benefits can explain the formation and growth of cities. The main sources of agglomeration 
externalities arise from improved opportunities for labor market pooling, knowledge interactions, 
specialization, the sharing of inputs and outputs, and from the existence of public goods (Chua, 
1993; Vayá, et al., 2004). Myrdal (1957) talks about “Circular Causation" or “Positive Feedback" 
(Arthur, 1989); where manufactures tend to locate around a large market, while the market also 
grows where production is concentrated. As the scale and density of urban and industrial 
agglomerations grows, we expect to see a further increase in the external benefits available to firms 
(Graham, 2006). 
New Economic Geography (NEG) theory posits that cities arise because the location of 
economic activity is influenced by market size, transportation cost, and economies of scale 
(Krugman & Livas-Elizondo, 1996). Krugman (1991) develops a two-region economy with tension 
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between agglomeration (or the “centripetal” force) arising from economies of scale plus transport 
costs, and pressures for dispersion (or the “centrifugal” force) arising from the transport costs to 
dispersed immobile farmers. He argues that manufacturing firms will try to locate themselves in or 
near a region with large demand for their products, but that city size will be limited by congestion 
costs. Further, Krugman et al. predict that the removal of trade barriers will primarily benefit those 
regions close to the new market, in our case, those regions closer to the U.S. border. 
In a later paper, Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996) model the centrifugal forces as coming 
from increased land rent as opposed to Krugman (1991) who assumes it is driven by demand from 
dispersed, immobile farmers. They show that in this case, increased trade can lead to dispersion of 
economic activity. The intuition is that as a new market arises from trade, the pull of the existent 
domestic market diminishes. The domestic center loses the consumers who can now consume from 
abroad. They apply this model to Mexico, and show that Mexico City has lost relevance as a 
determinant of regional economic growth over time.  
By contrast, Paluzie (2001) and Monfort et al. (2000) extend the original Krugman model by 
assuming that labor is immobile in the short run and show that trade agreements can increase 
agglomeration within the country, since as trade in manufacturing increases, regions with preexisting 
manufacturing facilities and labor (i.e. maquiladora hubs in the north of Mexico) will tend to benefit 
more than other regions. Like Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996), Paluzie (2001) assumes that 
high land costs and rents are the centrifugal force encouraging dispersion instead of the demand of 
dispersed agricultural population. The result is that once trade is opened up, imports and exports to 
and from the major cities increase more than the demand from rural areas (Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, 
2006). 
NEG has a specific focus on the dynamics of growth. Krugman et al. (1995) argue that as 
transport costs fall, or similarly, as trade barriers fall, one should observe convergence in real 
incomes, in which poorer peripheral nations gain and core nations may well lose. This idea is related 
to the notion of β-convergence (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992), which proposes that those regions 
with lower economic activity will grow more quickly over time. This theory of income dynamics has 
been heavily tested using data from the European Union (EU). In this modeling context, the initial 
level of per-capita GDP plays a central role in the explanation of income growth dynamics. Barro et 
al. (1992) find that within the EU, as internal trade barriers fell, regions experienced convergent 
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growth in GDP per capita in the period 1950-1985. Brakman et al. (2006), find similar results for the 
period between 1992 and 2000. Armstrong (1995) confirms the convergence in the EU for the 
periods of 1950-1960 and 1960-1970 but finds less convergence for the periods of 1970-1980 and 
1980-1990. Using a different but related methodology, Quah (1997) finds that Spain and Portugal, 
being the two countries with the highest rates of economic growth in the EU, are also those with the 
highest increase in regional imbalance. Sala-i Martin (1996) analyses Spain's regional convergence 
during the period 1950-1990, and although he finds convergence during the first decades, he 
determines that it fades after 1980. 
Outside of the EU, Rodriguez-Pose et al. (2006) find that among a variety of countries that 
increased trade from 1980 to 2000 (Brazil, China, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Spain and the U.S.), they 
observe a general trend of economic divergence. Thus we cannot say that there is an unambiguous 
effect of trade on the distribution of regional growth. 
In the two papers that explicitly test for economic convergence in Mexico, they both find that 
north-south patterns of growth were already in place before NAFTA, and there was no significant 
change in this pattern after the trade agreement. In Rodriguez-Pose et al. (2005), Mexico appears to 
follow a “Core and Periphery" pattern of economic development during the Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) period from the 1930s to 1985. Regional growth was mainly characterized by 
convergence and linked (1) to the presence of oil and raw materials and (2) to proximity to Mexico 
City. However, during the GATT period (1985-1993), proximity to Mexico City lost its relevance as 
a determinant of regional economic growth. Thus, Rodriguez-Pose et al. (2005) find evidence that 
the draw of Mexico City lessened after increased international trade, giving support to the 
hypothesis of Krugman and Livas-Elizondo that trade has decreased agglomeration in Mexico. 
Aroca et al. (2005) also find that NAFTA did not substantially change growth patterns in Mexico, 
and instead argue that agglomeration has emerged in the form of several income clusters. In 
particular, they find that southern states were lagging behind in economic growth before the trade 
agreement was signed. Hanson (1998a,b) argues there has been a cluster of economic activity created 
along the U.S. border, especially in the manufacturing sector, which has led to the decline of Mexico 
City's manufacturing belt since mid-1980s. Two recent papers test for the Stolper-Samuelson theory 
in Mexico. They ask whether Mexico benefited low-skilled labor relative to their high-skilled 
counterparts. Chiquiar (2008) uses regional differences in the effect of trade to identify NAFTA's 
impact on the premium earned by skilled workers. As would be anticipated by the Stolper-
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Samuelson theorem he finds that NAFTA decreased the skill premium in low-skill labor intensive 
Mexico. Nicita (2009) estimates the effect of NAFTA on real wages in Mexico and finds that richer 
households have gained more than poor ones. While poor households also benefit from NAFTA, 
their gains are considerably lower. He also finds that households in urban areas close to the U.S. 
border are the larger beneficiaries while households in southern states are largely bypassed by the 
effects of trade liberalization. In contrast to Chiquiar (2008), Nicita finds that NAFTA increased the 
gap between skilled and unskilled workers. In both papers, geography is represented by states or a 
group of states. 
2.3.2. Standard Trade Theory 
 
Along with affecting the strength of centripetal and centrifugal forces, trade likely has a direct 
effect on the location of economic activity. As long as inputs are not completely mobile, those 
regions with a greater amount of inputs used in export production will presumably gain more from 
trade than those regions who are endowed with inputs that most efficiently produce import-
substituting products. The standard Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model predicts that if Mexico has an 
abundant supply of unskilled labor relative to its trading partners, the United States and Canada, 
then it will export goods that are “unskilled-labor intensive". Therefore the “unskilled-labor 
intensive" goods industry will grow in Mexico and unskilled labor in Mexico will benefit from higher 
wages resulting from this increase in demand for their services. The Stolper Samuelson theorem 
then predicts that the real wage for low-skilled workers will increase. Further, one might anticipate 
that regions with abundant unskilled labor will benefit more than other areas from trade with the 
United States. Last, if the sector using the abundant input has increasing returns to scale, one might 
anticipate that trade will cause increasing agglomeration, despite the increasing congestion costs and 
the decreased pull of the domestic market. Combining the NEG and standard trade theory, we 
obtain the following testable hypotheses: 
H1: Due to transportation costs, the benefits of trade will be greater in those regions closer to the 
border 
H2: Following Krugman and Livas-Elizondo, trade will decrease agglomeration 
H2a: Alternatively, following Paluzie, et al., trade will increase agglomeration 
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H3: Assuming labor is not completely mobile; those regions with an abundance of low-skilled 
labor will benefit3 
H4: Traded sectors will be more influenced by NAFTA and distance to the U.S. market than 
non-traded sectors 
 
2.4. Empirical Model 
 
To explore the above hypotheses, we use a panel data model with error components that are 
both spatially and time-wise correlated to explain the change in economic output over the period 
1980-2003. 
The general formulation assumes that in each time period t =1,…,T the data is generated 
according to the following model: 
Equation 1 
                   
where       denotes an N×1 vector of observations of the dependent variable in time period t, 
      denotes the N×K matrix of observations of exogenous regressors in the same time period,   
is a corresponding K×1 vector of regression parameters, and       is a vector of disturbance terms. 
The disturbance process in each period follows a classical first order spatial autoregressive process: 
Equation 2 
                     
where   is an N×N weights matrix of known constants,
4   is a scalar generally referred to as 
the spatial autoregressive parameter, and       is a vector of stochastic shocks in time period t. To 
further allow for the shocks to be correlated over time, Kapoor et al. (2007) postulate an error 
component structure for the shock vector, that is: 
                                                 
3 Evidence that labor is not completely mobile comes from Chiquiar (2008) who finds little mobility of individuals across 
Mexican regions in five-year intervals surrounding the Mexican trade reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
4 In our empirical application we define a distance matrix with cut-off at the first quantile. 
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Equation 3 
                
where    represents the vector of panel-specific error components and 
     
 
 
               contains the error components that vary both over cross-sectional units 
and time periods. Finally,    is a T×1 unit vector and    an N×N identity matrix. Note that the 
specification of the error term in Equation 3 corresponds to that of a classical one-way error 
component model as in Baltagi (2008), the only difference being the way in which the data are 
grouped.  
Kapoor et al. (2007) maintain the assumption that the error components     are identically and 
independently distributed with mean zero, variance   
  and finite fourth moments. The error 
components     are also identically and independently distributed with mean zero, variance   
  and 
finite fourth moments. Finally, the two processes are independent. To estimate the spatial 
autoregressive parameter and the two variance components of the disturbance process, Kapoor et al. 
(2007) propose an extension of the generalized moment estimator developed in Kelejian and Prucha 
(1999). These estimators are then used to define a feasible generalized least square procedure 
(FGLS) for the regression parameters. Following the classical error component literature, a 
convenient way of calculating the FGLS estimator is to further transform the (spatially transformed) 
model by pre-multiplying it by        , where          ,     is an NT×NT identity matrix 
and    is the standard transformation matrix well known in the error component literature (properly 
adjusted to account for the different ordering of the data, as in Baltagi (2008)). The FGLS estimator 
is then identical to an OLS calculated on the “doubly” transformed model. 
We assume economic activity and growth will be a function of various measures of productivity, 
such as education and local infrastructure, transportation costs to the United States, and local market 
size. We then test whether the influence of these variables changed after NAFTA to determine 
which municipalities gained and lost from the trade agreement. We first consider growth (and levels) 
in overall GVA, and then split our data into traded and non-traded sectors, to see how the location 
of economic activity in traded sectors changed in response to NAFTA in comparison with the 
location of non-traded sectors. 
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2.4.1. Data 
 
We use data from the Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos (SIMBAD) generated by the Mexican 
National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information (INEGI, 2005). Specifically, within 
SIMBAD, we use information from the 1981, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004 economic census 
and the 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 population census. The information from each 
census corresponds to data from the previous year.5 
To observe how spatial patterns of economic activity have evolved, we use the log of the 
municipal Gross Value Added (GVA) deflated by the CPI.6 We also consider the growth rate, 
defined as the difference in the log GVA. Because GVA nets out the value of inputs from outside 
the municipality, it is negative in about 0.68% of the observations. Thus, we take the minimum 
GVA over all years and all municipalities and add it as a constant to all productivity levels to ensure 
we do not lose any observations.7 
Total GVA is calculated as the sum of the net output of various industrial sectors. When 
examining the data, we noticed a sharp change in the GVA of mining from 1980 to 1985, causing a 
very low correlation between municipal GVA in 1980 and 1985 and then again between 1985 and 
1988. In conversation with researchers at INEGI, we learned that the methodology for calculating 
mining GVA changed in this period. Therefore, to ensure that this anomaly did not affect our 
results, we use total GVA net of mining for the entire period. 
For the sectoral analysis, INEGI reports the GVA for manufacturing, wholesale/retail and 
services consistently over our time period. The manufacturing sector is comprised of establishments 
engaged in the mechanical, physical, or chemical transformation of materials, substances, or 
components into new products. The wholesale/retail sector is defined as firms engaged in 
wholesaling and retailing merchandise, generally precluding any physical transformation of the 
                                                 
5 Between the 1980 and 2004 censuses, 65 new municipalities were created. To analyze the same municipalities through 
the years, we merged the new municipalities back to their 1980 boundaries. We obtained the list of new municipalities 
and from where they were created (INEGI, 2006). For those created from more than one municipality, we allocate the 
new municipality data by the percentage of how many people (or how much land), in the new municipality, were taken 
from the former municipalities (information provided by SEGOB (2005)). 
6 GVA are presented in real thousand pesos from 2003. 
7 GVA is linked to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since both measure output. However, unlike GDP, GVA does 
not include taxes and subsidies on products. The use of GVA as the dependant variable is similar to the approach taken 
in Martin (2001), Fingleton and McCombie (1998), Fingleton and Lopez-Bazo (2006), Esquivel and Messmacher (2002). 
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product, and rendering services incidental to the sale of merchandise. The service sector includes 
financial, professional, health and educational services as well as tourism and food services. It also 
includes transportation (US Census Bureau, 2002). We argue that manufacturing is clearly a traded 
sector, producing both exports and import-competing products. Wholesale/retail is less easily 
defined, since it captures distribution of both imported and exported products, but the services it 
provides are not easily traded. We categorize services as the non-traded sector. 
NEG posits that distance to market influences the location of economic activity. Given the 
influence of the United States market even before NAFTA, we assume growth may be correlated 
with transportation costs to the U.S. border, which we proxy by road distance. We generate by 
calculating the log distance from the capital of each municipality (INEGI, 2008) to the closest 
border-crossing point (distance) (using webpage “Traza tu Ruta” provided by the Secretaría de 
Comunicaciones y Transportes (2008).8 To capture the effect of the local market, we include the 
population density in the municipality, measured in thousands of people per sq. kilometer lagged by 
one period (density). Further, like Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2005), to observe whether Mexico City has 
lost relevance as a determinant of regional economic growth over time, we included the variable 
mexcap, which is 1 if the municipalities are in the Federal District or in the State of Mexico.9  
We control for existing infrastructure by generating a dummy variable equal to one if more than 
80 percent of households have both electricity and drainage (infrastructure). To capture productive 
capacity, we include the literacy rate of the population greater than 14, literacy, and the percentage of 
the population with a high school degree, highschool, to capture high-skilled labor living in the 
municipality. 
We would be remiss if we did not include the free-trade zone established by the Mexican 
government to produce manufactured goods for the U.S. market before NAFTA.10 This zone was 
restricted to border communities in the northern states of Mexico. These towns/cities are Ensenada, 
Mexicali, Tecate, and Tijuana, in the state of Baja California; La Paz in Baja California Sur; Ciudad 
Acuña and Piedras Negras in Coahuila; Ciudad Juarez in Chihuahua; Agua Prieta and Nogales in 
                                                 
8 For municipal capitals that do not appear as an origin point, we calculate the distance of the nearest available city or 
town and add the road distance from that point to the municipal capital of interest, which we calculate manually by using 
a map of Mexico. 
9 which include Mexico City and the surrounding areas 
10 The maquiladora program is a governmental initiative, created by Mexico and the US in 1965, aimed at attracting 
foreign investment in the production of exportable goods, mainly in electronics and garment assembly (Fernández-Kelly, 
2007). 
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Sonora; and Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo and Reynosa in Tamaulipas (Smith, 1990; INEGI, 2007). 
We include the annual average number of maquiladora establishments by municipality, Estadística 
de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportación, (INEGI, 2007).11 All explanatory variables are lagged 
one period to address simultaneity. Summary statistics are presented in the appendix (Table 1). 
To capture the effect of the trade agreement, we include a dummy variable that equals 0 for 
periods before NAFTA (1980, 1985, 1988 & 1993) and 1 for periods after NAFTA (1999 & 2004) 
and also interact it with the various market, distance and productivity variables to determine which 
characteristics determined whether a municipality benefited or lost from the trade agreement. 
One issue we had with the data is that the change in GVA per municipality had a few notable 
outliers, lying over 10 standard deviations from the mean, resulting in a very peaked distribution. To 
ensure that our results were not driven by these outliers, we censored our sample at the first and 
99th percentile of the distribution each year. This censoring changed 186 observations, and does 
create a small mass at each end of the distribution each year. However, while our coefficient 
estimates were mostly unchanged with the censoring, our explanatory power greatly improved, and 
the regression results became more robust to changes in model specification. 
Hypotheses 
We use the above data to test the following hypotheses: 
H1: Proximity to the US market is more important for economic growth after NAFTA 
Specifically we test whether those regions closer to the U.S. border grew more rapidly after the 
trade agreement. Since cities and those regions closer to the border are already growing more quickly 
before NAFTA, an increase in the effect of the border would imply that NAFTA worsened regional 
inequalities. 
H2: Trade will decrease agglomeration. 
We test whether the draw of the domestic market weakens after NAFTA, and growth is faster in 
those regions with less dense population.  We also consider whether the influence of Mexico City 
diminished after NAFTA. 
                                                 
11 We use annual average of maquiladoras in 1990 for the period of 1988 since there is no data for 1988. 
16 
 
H3: Those regions with an abundance of low-skilled labor, measured by a low portion of the 
population with high school education, will benefit from trade. If Mexico is endowed with low-
skilled workers relative to the United States, we might expect these regions to benefit more from 
trade. Since these regions tend to be more slow-growing generally, this effect would help mitigate 
against regional inequality. 
H4: Traded sectors will be more influenced by NAFTA and distance to the U.S. market than 
non-traded sectors. Specifically, manufacturing, and to a lesser degree, wholesale/retail, will see 
locational changes as described in H1, while services will either remain in the same location, or 
perhaps will move in the opposite direction due to the increased wages and congestion costs caused 
by the growth of other industries. 
 
2.5. Results and Discussion 
 
Table 2 reports the regression results using panel data from 2,377 municipalities over six years 
(1980, 1985, 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003). We regress both the level and growth rate of GVA per 
municipality against various characteristics and see whether the influence of these characteristics 
changed after NAFTA. We find substantial spatial correlation in the error terms for both the level 
and the growth rate regression, with the degree of spatial correlation in the errors ( ) ranging from 
0.19 to 0.62. Thus, we believe we are justified in using a spatial panel model. 
We begin by considering the effect of the above characteristics on the level and growth of 
economic activity over the entire period (columns 1 and 3 in table 2). Over the entire time period, 
we find that those regions closer to the border have higher levels and growth rates of economic 
activity. As one would expect, both high school and literacy contribute to higher economic activity 
and growth, as does having a relatively well developed infrastructure. Last, we see that maquiladoras 
also facilitated economic activity. 
To consider the effect of trade, we then estimate economic activity and growth as a function of 
the above variables alone and interacted with a dummy variable for the years after NAFTA. Turning 
to our first hypothesis, we find that although economic activity is already more robust near the 
border before NAFTA, the trade agreement reinforces this pattern. For instance, a municipality 
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located a thousand kilometers from the border, like Tonalá in the pacific coastal state of Jalisco,12 
has an 8 percent lower GVA on average than those municipalities along the border (such as Tijuana 
and Mexicali in Baja California). After NAFTA, that disparity in output grows to 15 percent. The 
difference is even starker in terms of growth rate. Although municipalities closer to the border do 
not grow significantly more quickly than others before the trade agreement, after NAFTA, they 
grow 0.6 percent per year more quickly than their counterparts 1000 km away. Thus, the economic 
disparity continues to grow since NAFTA was implemented. 
Population density also affects GVA. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the higher the population density, 
the larger the municipal GVA. However, we observe a further concentration of economic activity 
after NAFTA. Before NAFTA a thousand more residents per km2 leads to a 5 percent higher GVA, 
which increases to 7 percent after the trade agreement. For cities at the border, this differential 
increases substantially after NAFTA, where a thousand more people per km2 generate 16 percent 
higher GVA. 
As with distance, we observe the effect of density both in levels and in the growth rate of GVA. 
For the average municipality which sits approximately 1000 km from the border, an extra thousand 
people per km2 results in a small 0.04 percent decrease in growth rate overall, and a 0.01 percent 
annual higher growth rate after NAFTA. This effect is much more pronounced at the border, where, 
after NAFTA, an extra 1000 people per km2 leads to a 0.7 percent increase in growth per year. Thus, 
we can reject our second hypothesis that trade leads to less agglomeration. In particular, we observe 
particularly strong forces of agglomeration at the border after trade. 
As hinted by the summary statistics in Table 2, we also observe that the economic influence of 
Mexico City appears to be declining over time. This evidence conforms with the Krugman and 
Livas-Elizondo (1996) finding that while the US market appears to be increasing in importance, the 
domestic market represented by Mexico City is perhaps less important after NAFTA. While not 
significant in terms of growth rate, we do observe a decrease in the level of economic activity after 
NAFTA, effectively negating its advantage before the trade agreement. 
Moving to our third hypothesis, NAFTA appears to benefit those municipalities with a larger 
fraction of unskilled workers, here defined as workers without high school education. Although 
these municipalities have lower GVAs before NAFTA, they benefit more economically from the 
                                                 
12 Tonalá is 1,000.26 km from the nearest border crossing point by road. 
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trade agreement than their counterparts with more skilled workers. That said, we find that literacy 
appears to be a necessary condition for workers to benefit from trade. Those municipalities with a 
higher fraction of illiterate workers lag before NAFTA in terms of economic level and growth, and 
NAFTA makes this disparity worse. 
Perhaps most striking are the results on infrastructure. First, we find that those municipalities 
with better infrastructure, here defined as having 80 percent of housing with both electricity and 
drainage, have higher GVA overall.  That said, trade appears to mitigate against this difference. In 
particular, in the case of growth rate, the differential between those municipalities with high 
infrastructure and without almost disappears entirely. Part of this result might be explained by 
noting that there was a marked increase in the number of communities with good infrastructure over 
this time, going from about 16 percent of municipalities right before NAFTA to 43 percent in 2003. 
That said, it is still notable that the majority of municipalities without good infrastructure after 
NAFTA are no longer lagging their counterparts in terms of economic growth. Combined with the 
findings on education, this result seems to indicate that NAFTA is not as preferential as many have 
thought. We find evidence that NAFTA appears to help regions struggling with human and physical 
infrastructure deficits. 
We also control for the number of maquiladoras in a municipality, noting that since these regions 
already had tariff-free access to the United States for some of their production, we would expect 
them to be less affected by NAFTA. We do observe a higher level of GVA as well as a higher 
growth rate in those municipalities with a larger number of maquiladoras. After NAFTA, however, 
we see a slight further increase in the level of GVA associated with maquiladoras, but a significant 
decrease in the rate of growth for those same municipalities. Thus, having a maquiladora in one's 
municipality is a boon to growth, but the trade agreement, by reducing tariffs overall, diffused these 
benefits. 
When we include all the interaction terms, the level and growth rate of economic activity for the 
average municipality both appear to decrease after NAFTA. Given the peso crisis which caused a 
real contraction in Mexican GDP right after NAFTA was implemented, these results are perhaps 
not so surprising.  
To see the implications of NAFTA on municipalities throughout Mexico, we map out the effect 
of distance, density and infrastructure on growth rates in 1989 through 1994 and 1999 to 2004 
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(Figure 4, panels a and b). We keep the categories constant for the two figures. The effect of 
distance from the border is given in shades of grey, with the lighter shades implying growth is much 
lower than at the border. Before NAFTA, we do not observe a sharp drop-off in growth rates as we 
move away from the border, and one has to reach into central Mexico around Mexico city before 
one reaches municipalities that grow 0.05 percent more slowly than those municipalities at the 
border. Municipalities in the far south of the country grow a little less quickly, but the difference is 
negligible. In terms of density, we observe cities growing slightly more slowly before the trade 
agreement, represented by light blue. Last, the cross-hatched regions represent those municipalities 
with 80 percent of housing having electricity and drainage. These regions were growing more quickly 
before NAFTA.  
In panel (b), we observe the effect of distance, density and infrastructure after NAFTA. Now we 
see a much more dramatic drop-off in economic growth rates as we move away from the border. As 
an example, those municipalities in the south now lag their border counterparts by nearly 0.5 percent 
growth per year. The other striking difference is that density, particularly density in the north, is now 
strongly positively correlated with growth (as represented by the bold diagonal shading). Last, we see 
many more municipalities with good housing infrastructure, but the effect of that infrastructure on 
growth has dropped from nearly 0.8 extra percent growth rate to 0.1 percent. 
Sectoral Results 
To check whether the observed changes after NAFTA can be attributed to the trade agreement 
or are simply a result of a time trend, we divide our data into sectors, to compare results for those 
products more and less likely to be directly affected by trade. Table 3 presents the sectoral regressions 
results for output and output growth in the manufacturing, wholesale/retail, and service sectors, 
respectively. 
We begin with the sector we expect to be most affected by NAFTA: manufacturing. We see a 
similar pattern for manufacturing as we observe in the total GVA regression. Specifically, the closer 
the municipality to the border, the higher the GVA, and NAFTA substantially increases this distance 
premium from 6 to 14 percent. As with the result for total GVA, the change is more marked for 
GVA growth, with 0.1 percent higher growth for border municipalities before NAFTA compared to 
0.5 percent increase in growth rate afterward. 
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Like the total GVA, manufacturing output is larger in more densely-populated urban areas, and 
these areas benefit more from NAFTA than their rural counterparts. Specifically, for municipalities 
along the border, the marginal effect of density increases more than ten-fold for manufacturing after 
NAFTA. Further, the interaction between density and distance from the border is highly significant, 
implying that NAFTA specifically benefits manufacturing in cities close to the border. 
We observe similar patterns for the wholesale/retail sector. Proximity to the border increases 
wholesale and retail activity, and this relationship strengthens after NAFTA. However, this increase 
is primarily driven by an increase in activity in larger urban centers near the border and for sparsely 
populated regions the effect of the border does not substantially change after the trade agreement.  
This result is understandable given that we might expect wholesale/retail to be less affected by trade 
in general. However, the regression on economic growth rate shows that those municipalities closer 
to the border did increase their economic output from the wholesale/retail sector more quickly after 
NAFTA. Perhaps these wholesale/retail centers in urban areas along the border are focused on 
reselling imports, or facilitating exports. 
The effect of distance is even smaller for services. Although proximity to the border does 
increase the level of economic activity in the services sector, and this effect increases slightly after 
NAFTA, the effect is not significant. Further, the growth rate in services is actually higher for those 
municipalities further from the border after NAFTA. As most services are not traded internationally, 
this result is appealingly intuitive. The relationship between growth in the services sector and 
population density also remains unchanged with NAFTA, unlike the other two sectors. Thus, we see 
substantial differences in the effect of NAFTA among traded and non-traded sectors. 
All three sectors see an increase in activity in urban centers after NAFTA, although this is 
significant in the growth rate only for the wholesale/retail sector. Interestingly, we see a significant 
reduction in economic activity in Mexico City for only the two traded sectors, while services, if 
anything increase in the nation's capital. 
Other notable differences among the sectors is that while for all three sectors having better 
human and physical infrastructure leads to a higher level of output, NAFTA had very different 
effects on these relationships. While in manufacturing, having a high fraction of the municipality 
with access to drainage and electricity was, if anything more important after NAFTA, the converse 
was true for the services and wholesale/retail sectors. In other words, municipalities with high levels 
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of drainage and electricity saw the benefits of that infrastructure fall significantly after NAFTA in 
the non-traded sector. For example, while municipalities with high levels of infrastructure have an 
average 6 percent higher GVA in services than their counterparts before NAFTA, that difference 
shrinks to 2.5 percent after NAFTA. We see a similar pattern for growth.  While the premium on 
growth rates associated with infrastructure diminishes for all sectors after NAFTA the change is 
most dramatic for services, where municipalities go from a 2 percent boost in growth from high 
infrastructure to essentially no difference after NAFTA. Thus, it appears as if NAFTA 
disproportionately benefits the non-traded sectors in poorer municipalities. 
The differences for literacy appear in the regression on growth rates. Having a more literate 
workforce is associated with an increased rate of growth overall, and a further increase in 
manufacturing and wholesale/retail GVA after NAFTA. However, it is associated with a lower rate 
of growth in services after the trade agreement. One possible explanation is that the service sector is 
being crowded out of these markets by increased labor demand from the manufacturing and 
wholesale/retail sectors, which may have higher wages.  
Those regions with a large percentage of high school graduates earn a smaller premium in all 
three sectors after NAFTA. That said, the most dramatic drop is in manufacturing, which might 
imply that unskilled workers are in higher demand because of trade. 
The last notable differences among the sectors come from the role of maquiladoras. A 
maquiladora leads to higher levels and growth rates of GVA in all three sectors. However, after 
NAFTA, the extra GVA from maquiladoras shrinks for wholesale/retail and services, while it 
increases in manufacturing. That said, for all three sectors, the extra growth rate associated with 
maquiladoras diminishes after the trade agreement. Thus, it appears as if manufacturing facilities are 
being set up in municipalities with pre-existing maquiladoras after NAFTA, but not at the same rate 
as manufacturing is growing elsewhere. Wholesale/retail and services appear to be concentrating 
their expansion elsewhere after NAFTA. 
Robustness tests 
We test the robustness of our results to different specifications. As a first step, we run the 
regression as non-spatial data with random effects and obtain qualitatively similar results. When we 
employ robust standard errors, we see some differences in significance but the overall significance 
level remains essentially unchanged.  
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To control for the effect of migration, we include the percent of population that reside in a 
different entity 5 years ago (immigration). The dummy variable for Mexico City becomes 
insignificant, but all other coefficients and significance levels remain substantively the same.  
Given that GVA nets out the value of inputs from outside the municipality, it is particularly high 
for those regions with valuable natural resources used in final goods production.  We control for 
these endowments by generating a dummy variable for municipalities with oil production. The 
estimated coefficient for this variable was not significant, and estimates for the other coefficients 
were identical, therefore we decided not to include these estimations in this chapter.  
Since population and high-skilled labor can move freely around the country, we tested the 
hypothesis of the influence of these variables in neighboring municipalities.  In other words we 
added spatial lags for population and high school in the main regression equation. Coefficients for 
these spatially-weighted variables were not highly significant, and our other coefficients remained 
unchanged. 
One might also be concerned that the spatial correlation of the data changes before and after 
NAFTA.  To test this, we split the data into two time periods and run each regression separately. 
While the coefficients and their significance remains essentially unchanged from the earlier results, 
we do observe a decrease in the level of spatial correlation after NAFTA in the level regression, and 
a slight increase in spatial correlation in municipal growth. When we test for the significance of the 
spatial correlation we find both that spatial correlation is significantly different from zero and 
second, that it changes significantly in all cases after NAFTA.13  
Finally, we also experimented with different spatial weights matrices, such as various definitions 
of nearest neighbors, a binary contiguity (queen based) criterion, and a full matrix of inverse 
distances. Very few differences were observed in the various estimations and the significance of the 
estimated coefficients remained substantively identical. We can conclude that our results are also 
robust to different definition of the spatial weights.  
                                                 
13 To obtain an estimate of the standard error of  , we took advantage of the expression of the model likelihood. When 
the number of observations increases, the GM estimates should converge to values close to the ML estimator. Under 
this assumption, after estimating the model by GM one can evaluate the likelihood at the GM estimate and use a 
numerical Hessian on the expression of the concentrated likelihood to obtain an estimate of the standard error for  .  
The test on the two values of   (pre- and post-NAFTA estimates) is then based on the following expression  
                          
Although formally one should use a Chow test, the extension of the Chow test to a spatial context is not straightforward. 
Therefore the test results should be interpreted with care. 
23 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
 
The chapter studies the regional distribution of the benefits from trade in Mexico after NAFTA. 
We find that Mexico's trade liberalization via NAFTA has caused important changes in the location 
of economic activity. Although regional disparities have existed in Mexico since industrialization 
began in the 1930s (López Malo, 1960), NAFTA appears to have exacerbated these regional trends, 
concentrating growth in regions that already had larger GVA: specifically in the north and in urban 
centers. 
Thus, we find that trade liberalization has not reduced territorial disparities, but rather led to a 
greater regional polarization. While Mexican municipalities close to the U.S. market have profited 
from integration by increasing their production and incomes, regions further away from the United 
States have become more disconnected from Mexico's integration into world markets. Specifically, 
we find that while NAFTA increased the rate of economic growth by 0.04% for municipalities at the 
border, it actually decreased GVA by over 0.5% for a municipality in the southern end of the 
country. 
However, north-south disparities are only one part of the story. Contrary to popular belief, we 
find that NAFTA appeared to benefit those regions with poorer infrastructure, decreasing the gap 
between regions with higher levels of drainage and electricity and those without. Similarly, like 
Chiquiar (2008) we find evidence for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. We see evidence that NAFTA 
also lowered the gap between regions with high rates of high school education and those without. 
Thus, it appears as if NAFTA did have some redistributive effect. That said, those poorest regions 
with high rates of illiteracy fared even worse after the trade agreement. 
To ascertain whether the change in the location of economic activity is truly associated with 
NAFTA or merely an outcome of other temporal effects, we divide the data into sector.  We find 
that the changes we attribute to the trade agreement in the total GVA regression are most 
pronounced in the traded sector.  Specifically, we see that the U.S. border has the largest effect on 
economic activity and growth in manufacturing.  While, as in manufacturing, the benefits of 
NAFTA in the wholesale/retail sector are also concentrated in larger urban centers, the border has a 
smaller attraction overall. Further, the border appears to have, if anything a repellent effect for the 
service sector after NAFTA. 
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We also see manufacturing concentrating in those areas with better infrastructure, more literate 
labor and with maquiladoras after NAFTA. This distribution is different for the non-traded sectors. 
Specifically, it appears as if retail/wholesale are growing faster in regions without maquiladoras and 
services in particular are being driven out of regions with more literate labor after the trade 
agreement. Thus, it appears as if the redistributive effect of NAFTA is coming from a displacement 
of the non-traded sectors, while the traded sectors are if anything being concentrated in wealthier 
regions. 
In summary, we find evidence supporting the claim that NAFTAs benefits primarily went to 
those regions already doing well economically. Of particular concern is that these disparities appear 
to be increasing even after NAFTA. Thus, if a government objective is to reduce economic 
disparity, one can argue that there is a need for redistributive policies to go alongside trade 
agreements. That said, regional development policy might try to make use of the fact that non-
traded sectors appear to be willing to move to poorer regions, mitigating some of the economic 
disparity enhanced by trade. 
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2.7. Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics. Reported statistics are mean, (standard errors), and [minimum, maximum] values. 
Variable Deﬁnition 1980 1985 1988 1993 1998 2003 
n Number of observations 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
GVA Gross value added (for commerce, 5,279,121 5,112,340 5,103,985 5,136,728 5,337,328 5,432,869 
 manufacturing and service sectors) (3,287,181) (2,559,055) (2,754,360) (4,100,484) (4,610,239) (5,037,900) 
 in real thousands of pesos [0;  9.40e+07] [4,228,733; 5.50e+07] [3,834,649; 5.42e+07] [4,625,045; 9.73e+07] [3,746,338; 1.22e+08] [4,064,832; 1.42e+08] 
        
Wholesale/retail  Gross value added (wholesale/retail 849,224 876,018 881,602 942,398 968,683 1,004,497 
GVA sector) in real thousands of pesos (760,407) (789,109) (827,241) (1,226,223) (1,242,739) (1,315,894) 
  [544,514; 2.40e+07] [755,910; 1.91e+07] [754,544; 2.20e+07] [760,419; 2.92e+07] [756,854; 2.26e+07] [ 0; 2.44e+07] 
        
Manufacturing Gross value added (manufacturing sector) 5,063,800 5,044,703 5,069,130 5,122,254 5,146,699 5,200,313 
GVA in real thousands of pesos (1,919,896) (1,477,370) (1,753,279) (1,887,889) (1,892,800) (2,084,692) 
  [ 0 ; 3.89e+07] [4,182,669; 3.74e+07] [3,924,790; 4.67e+07] [4,711,708; 4.28e+07] [2,307,621; 3.44e+07] [354,687; 4.37e+07] 
        
Service GVA Gross value added (service sector) in real 279,459 263,407 266,138 352,818 397,630 426,807 
 thousands of pesos (901,260) (557,894) (526,354) (1,424,952) (2,502,805) (2,878,753) 
  [200,085; 3.68e+07] [206,179; 1.69e+07] [ 0 ; 1.71e+07] [207,178; 4.76e+07] [159,838; 8.87e+07] [201,339; 1.13e+08] 
        
distance Logarithm of the road distance from the 6.80 6.80 6.80 6.80 6.80 6.80 
 municipality head to the nearest (0.883) (0.883) (0.883) (0.883) (0.883) (0.883) 
 border-crossing point [0;7.78] [0;7.78] [0;7.78] [0;7.78] [0;7.78] [0;7.78] 
        
density Population (thousands) per square  0.19 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.25 
 kilometer (1.27) (1.18) (1.11) (1.12) (1.14) (1.11) 
  [0;24.98] [0.00;21.62] [0.00;18.27] [0.00;17.79] [0.00;17.68] [0.00;16.03] 
        
mexcap Dummy variable = 1 if state = D.F. 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 or  Mexico (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
  [0;1] [0;1] [0;1] [0;1] [0;1] [0;1] 
        
high education % of Population with associate, 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 
 undergraduate or  graduate degree (0.021) (0.026) (0.030) (0.035) (0.041) (0.052) 
  [0;0.27] [0;0.30] [0;0.34] [0;0.38] [0;0.42] [0;0.49] 
        
literacy Literacy rate of population older than 14 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.83 
  (0.167) (0.153) (0.144) (0.130) (0.119) (0.109) 
  [0.07;0.98] [0.11;0.98] [0.14;0.98] [0.17;0.99] [0.25;0.99] [0.29;0.99] 
        
infrastructure Dummy variable = 1 if % of households 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.16 0.20 0.43 
 with both electricity and drainage N 80 (0.11) (0.14) (0.21) (0.37) (0.40) (0.49) 
  [0;1] [0;1] [0;1] [0;1] [0;1] [0;1] 
        
maquila Number of maquiladora establishments 0.23 0.32 0.57 0.67 0.83 0.77 
  (4.29) (6.63) (10.74) (13.05) (15.93) (14.24) 
  [0;123] [0;238] [0;414] [0;531] [0;667] [0;568] 
        
NAFTA Dummy variable for  NAFTA years 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 (1998 and 2003) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  [0;0] [0;0] [0;0] [0;0] [1;1] [1;1] 
26 
 
Table 2: Total GVA and growth rate of GVA. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: ***0.001, **0.01, 
*0.05, ,0.1 
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Table 3: GVA and growth rate of GVA for different sectors. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, :, 0.1. 
  Manufacturing Commerce Services 
Dependent  variable: ln GVA ln GVA  growth GVA growth GVA ln GVA ln GVA growth GVA growth GVA ln GVA  ln GVA  growth GVA  growth GVA  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(Intercept) 15.2278*** 15.2597*** -0.0016* -0.0015*** 13.1283 13.1609*** -0.0150*** -0.0163*** 11.8202*** 11.8191*** -0.0138*** -0.0175*** 
  (0.0298) (0.0281) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0475) (0.0453) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0744) (0.0613) (0.0019) (0.0024) 
distance -0.0109*** -0.0083** -0.0003*** -0.0002. -0.0064 -0.0056 -0.0001 0.0004* -0.0129. -0.0122. -0.0002 -0.0001 
  (0.0032) (0.0032) (8.22e-05) (0.0001) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
density .0532*** .0532*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** .0966*** .0931*** 0.0002. 0.0003* .0989*** .0897*** 1.76e-05 -0.0015*** 
  (0.0020) (0.0020) (7.36e-05) (0.0001) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
mexcap -0.0206. -0.0090 0.0003 0.0009. -0.0883*** -0.0580** -0.0009. -0.0013* -0.0757** -0.0791*** 0.0005 0.0003 
  (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0173) (0.0177) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0235) (0.0239) (0.0006) (0.0009) 
highschool .3412*** .9791*** 0.0103** 0.0121* .8683*** .5885*** .0827*** .1332*** 4.8840*** .2581*** .1351*** .2457*** 
  (0.0582) (0.0826) (0.0033) (0.0054) (0.1140) (0.1603) (0.0045) (0.0069) (0.140) (0.1980) (0.0065) (0.0114) 
literacy .0300*** .0227*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** .0571*** .0528*** 0.0020*** .0017*** 0.0648*** .0638*** .0018*** .0022*** 
  (0.0017) (0.0018) (6.13e-05) (8.40e-05) (0.0028) (0.0030) (8.20e-05) (0.0001) (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
infrastructure .0199*** 0.0194* 0.0015*** 0.0037*** 0.0175* 0.0375* 0.0021*** .0071*** .0366*** 0.0622** .0029*** .0231*** 
  (0.0033) (0.0077) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0070) (0.0163) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0083) (0.0192) (0.0007) (0.0017) 
maquila .0026*** .0016*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** .0032*** .0033*** 4.53e-05*** 0.0001*** .0045*** .0051*** 9.96e-05*** 0.0003*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0002) (7.06e-06) (1.35e-05) (0.0002) (0.0004) (9.46e-06) (1.67e-05) (0.0003) (0.0004) (1.36e-05) (2.83e-05) 
nafta   -0.0209   -0.0005   -0.1307***   0.0032   -0.1469***   0.0074 
    (0.0153)   (0.0017)   (0.0326)   (0.0024)   (0.0388)   (0.0046) 
nafta*distance   -0.0085***   -0.0003.   -0.0040   -0.0010***   -0.0027   0.0005 
    (0.0017)   (0.0002)   (0.0037)   (0.0003)   (0.0043)   (0.0005) 
nafta*density   .0778***   0.0038.   .3149***   .0101***   .2677***   0.0043 
    (0.0227)   (0.0022)   (0.0480)   (0.0027)   (0.0566)   (0.0045) 
nafta*mexcap   -0.02211***   -0.0013.   -0.0682***   0.0014   0.0074   9.66e-05 
    (0.0060)   (0.0008)   (0.0129)   (0.0009)   (0.0150)   (0.00175) 
nafta*highschool   -0.6230***   -0.0019   -0.0856   -0.0759***   -0.0564   -0.2037*** 
    (0.0647)   (0.0074)   (0.1371)   (0.0087)   (0.1614)   (0.0168) 
nafta*literacy   .0100***   0.0003**   .0162***   0.0005**   .0137***   -0.0013*** 
    (0.0011)   (0.0001)   (0.0023)   (0.0001)   (0.0027)   (0.0003) 
nafta*infrastructure   0.0047   -0.0026**   -0.0286   -0.0052***   -0.0392.   -0.0223*** 
    (0.0082)   (0.0009)   (0.0175)   (0.0010)   (0.0206)   (0.0018) 
nafta*maquila   .0007***   -4.30e-05*   -0.0006*   -0.0001***   -0.0011**   -0.0003*** 
    (0.0001)   (1.69e-05)   (0.0003)   (1.94e-05)   (0.0004)   (3.84e-05) 
nafta*distance*density   -0.0129***   -0.0007*   -0.0432***   -0.0016***   -0.0323***   -0.0004 
    (0.0033)   (0.0003)   (0.0069)   (0.0004)   (0.0082)   (0.0006) 
ρ 0.8285 0.7450 1.04e-06 3.62e-05 0.8328 0.7115 0.8469 0.8487 0.8950 0.7386 0.8936 0.7711 
σ2v 0.0046 0.0046 7.67e-05 7.60e-05 0.0212 0.0215 0.0001 9.80e-05 0.0290 0.0292 0.0004 0.0004 
σ21 0.0701 0.0669 6.16e-05 6.19e-05 0.1721 0.1661 0.0001 0.0001 0.3201 0.3089 0.0002 0.0002 
θ 0.7444 0.7373 -0.1163 -0.1085 0.6488 0.6403 0.0826 0.0866 0.6991 0.6925 -0.4352 -0.4075 
T (time) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
N (cross-sections) 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 2377 
NT (Observations) 11885 11885 11885 11885 11885 11885 11885 11885 11885 11885 11885 11885 
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2.8. Figures 
Figure 1: Mexico Regional Sub-division 
 
Figure 2: Gross Value Added in real pesos by Region 
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Figure 3 : (a) Growth of GVA before NAFTA from 1980 to 1985;  (b) Growth  of GVA after NAFTA from 1998 to 
2003 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
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Figure 4: Effect of distance, density and infrastructure on growth rates in 1989 through 1994 (a) and 1999 to 
2004 (panel b). 
 
(a) 
 
(b)  
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3. REGIONAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL MIGRATION IN MEXICO 
3.1. Introduction  
 
Trade causes growth in some industries and regions and contraction in others.  For people to be 
able to benefit from trade, they need to be able to migrate to those areas where new jobs are being 
created. However, only a limited number of papers study how internal migration responds to 
international trade (Aroca & Maloney, Migration, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico, 
2005; Aguayo Tellez, 2005) and much of the internal migration literature has failed to find a 
significant impact of international trade on internal migration. In previous work, I show that the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has increased regional disparities in Mexico, 
which might be mitigated through internal migration (Baylis, Garduño-Rivera, & Piras, 2012).  In 
this chapter, I ask whether migration has increased in response to U.S.-Mexico trade, and explore 
those factors that facilitate and hinder labor mobility within Mexico.   
People migrate in order to benefit from higher wages caused by trade (Paul, 1971). But, not all 
people that want to migrate can (Dubey, Palmer-Jones, & Sen, 2006). Literature on credit constraints 
and migration show that the poorest unskilled workers have a low propensity to migrate because 
they cannot finance the move (Phan & Coxhead, 2010). In particular, poor from rural regions face a 
barrier to migration resulting in heightened income disparities within the rural sector (Connell, 1983; 
Lucas, 1997). Connell (1983) finds that "migration proceeds out of inequality and further establishes 
this inequality" with outmigration of the more able workers further limiting economic growth in 
rural areas. This effect might also be attributed to the fact that while the poor have a larger incentive 
to migrate, the wealthier individuals also tend to have higher levels of education, increasing their 
propensity to migrate (Levy & Wadycki, 1974). This chapter asks whether barriers to migrate have 
changed with trade openness. 
The NAFTA negotiations started in February 1991; six years after Mexico joined the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1985. This announcement raised much speculation 
about the effect of NAFTA on Mexican migration patterns. The Mexican president at the time, 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, warned that Mexico will export either migrants or goods to the United 
States, and argued that Mexico would prefer to export products rather than people (Cornelius & 
Martin, 1993). Even if Salinas’ idea of increasing domestic economic activity to decrease the flow of 
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Mexican migrants to the North was appealing, not all migration specialists predicted that labor 
movement from Mexico to the United States would decrease with NAFTA. In fact, in the first 
decade of the agreement, some experts predicted that it would actually increase, as the large number 
of Mexicans displaced by economic restructuring would lead temporarily to more migration to the 
United States, creating a “hump” of migration (Audley, Demetrios, Polaski, & Vaughan, 2004).  
Most of the migration literature has failed to show the effect of trade liberalization on migration 
(Borjas, Economics of Migration, 2000; Greenwood, International Migration in Developed 
Countries, 1997; Lucas, 1997; Aroca & Maloney, Migration, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in 
Mexico, 2005), especially internal migration. The small number of studies that explicitly analyze the 
effect of trade liberalization on internal migration in Mexico are limited in the sense that they utilize 
state-level data (Aroca & Maloney, Migration, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico, 
2005; Aguayo Tellez, 2005). State-level data limits the spatial distribution of internal migration across 
Mexico and severely restricts the number of observations. Therefore, I believe this chapter offers 
the following four contributions: First, I use migration flows at the state to district level (instead of 
the state to state level) to identify the relationship between trade and internal migration patterns. The 
use of spatial state-district level regressions increases the number of observation and the possibility 
to observe geographic patterns. Second, to identify the effect of NAFTA, I first estimate the effect 
of trade openness on the growth on different sectors in different locations, and then estimate the 
effect of these different sectors on migration.  Thus, I explicitly measure the effect of NAFTA on 
migration through its effect on regional economic output. Third, I include 2005 migration 
information to analyze the more recent effects of lowered trade barriers. Finally, in my estimation, I 
explicitly control for the spatial nature of the data by using a spatial econometric gravity model of 
origin-destination flows (LeSage & Pace, Spatial Econometric Modeling of Origen-Destination 
Flows, 2008).  
This chapter finds that NAFTA has increased internal migration. But its effect on internal 
migration has diminished over time with most of the trade-generated migration occurring before 
Mexico joined the NAFTA. Second, Migration to the United States has increased after NAFTA due 
to the pull effect caused by the U.S. economy over the transportation cost (Luckstead, Devadoss, & 
Rodriguez, 2012). Third, rural to urban migration has also increased after NAFTA. Further, this 
chapter also explores what other factor have contributed to internal migration. Places with higher 
levels of infrastructure will attract workers but places with significant income disparities are not able 
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to attract workers. Finally, maquiladoras in the US-Mexico border region continue to attract internal-
migration even after NAFTA. As expected, I find a substantial degree of spatial correlation in the 
error terms for the spatial-error and spatial-lag cross section models. 
Some of the barriers to migration I have analyzed in this chapter have changed over time. The 
cost of moving (which I capture using the distance from origin to destination) have lowered during 
the last decade due to better roads and economical bus services allowing people to migrate longer 
distances. Infrastructure plays an important role as a barrier to migrate since a better level of 
infrastructure at the origin decreases outmigration. But the lack of infrastructure gains strength as a 
push factor after NAFTA. Another important barrier to migration is the percentage of population 
that owns their home at the origin. As expected, people who own their houses are less likely to 
migrate. However, this effect decreases after NAFTA. Last, fertility rate and the percentage of 
women at the origin lose their effect as barriers to migrate after NAFTA perhaps indicating that 
women are more likely to participate in migration themselves after NAFTA. 
In the next section, I look at the background of internal migration in Mexico before and after 
NAFTA and review the trade and migration literature which describe which factors might affect the 
internal-migration. Next, I present my empirical model followed by a description of the data. Finally, 
I present the results and provide the conclusions of this chapter. 
 
3.2. Background on Trade and Internal Mexican Migration 
 
Trade with the United States has long influenced labor migration inside of Mexico.  In 1965, the 
United States unilaterally ended the Bracero program, which had allowed Mexican workers into the 
United States for short periods as temporary farm labor, and many former Bracero employees and 
their families were left at the northern Mexican border.14  To create jobs for former Bracero workers 
and their families who had moved to the border area, the Mexican government established the 
maquiladora program to attract foreign direct investment. This maquiladora (or foreign-owned 
assembly plant) industry is the largest industry on the Mexican side of the Mexico-US border (Canas, 
Coronado, Gilmer, & Saucedo, 2011; Martin P. , Immigration, Agriculture, and the Border, 2002). 
                                                 
14
 Under the Bracero program, Mexicans were given renewable six-month visas to work for approved agricultural 
growers, located mostly in the southwestern United States. (Durand, Massey, & Zenteno, 2001) 
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Maquiladoras are normally owned by foreigners that import raw material and components duty-free 
to Mexico, assemble them into finished goods and send them back to the United States (Martin P. , 
2002). Maquiladoras attract people, especially women15, from the interior of Mexico to the Mexico-US 
border region to work (Cravey, 1998). The employment and exports of maquiladoras are shown in 
Table 4.  
Table 4 Maquiladora Employment and Exports: 1965-2000 
Year Maquiladoras Employment Exports ($mil) Exports (%) Wage and 
Benefits Paid 
1965 12 3,000    
1970 120 20,327 83 6  
1975 454 67,213 332 11 194 
1980 578 119,546 772 5 456 
1985 789 211,968 1,268 6 540 
1990 1,924 472,000 3,635 14  
1995 2,206 674,692    
2000 3,900 1,400,000    
Source: (Martin P. , 2002, p. 124) 
As with the maquiladoras before, NAFTA was expected to generate employment in Mexico by 
attracting investment to produce exports for the United States (Martin P. , 1993). However, this 
newly created employment has been concentrated mainly in areas with easy access to the U.S. 
economy, especially in the Mexico-US border region, where most of the maquiladoras are located 
(Aguayo Tellez, 2005; Hanson G. , Localization economies, vertical organization, and trade, 1996). 
This effect creates a massive internal migration of workers from the south and center of Mexico to 
the northern region (Hanson G. , Localization economies, vertical organization, and trade, 1996). 
Many of these migrants see this move as a step to further migrate to the U.S. (Cornelius & Martin, 
1993, p. 486). Other internal migrants that come from the agricultural south do not end up in 
maquiladoras but in the Pacific Northwest of Mexico, where they work in export-oriented 
agriculture companies. Many of these workers also culminate their trip working in agricultural fields 
in the U.S. (Cornelius & Martin, 1993). 
Looking at raw migration data from the economic and population censuses from the National 
Institute of Statistic and Geography (INEGI), from 1990 to 2000 internal migration increased 
slightly after NAFTA. Although the percentage of migrants decreased from 4.9% to 4.2%, due to 
the fact that total population increased more than total migration, the number of internal migrants 
increased from 3,477,237 to 3,584,957.  The more substantial shift was in the locations to which 
people were migrating.  The northern Border States had 710,249 in-migrants in 1990, 20% of the 
                                                 
15
 In 2000, 60 to 70%  of the assembly-line workers in the maquiladoras were women (Martin P. , 2002)  
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total migration, but in 2000, these states had 811,815 in-migrants, or 23%. The central states (D.F. & 
Mexico) saw an opposite effect on in-migration: in-migration went from 1,086,305 (31% of the total 
migration) in 1990, to 1,064,694 (30%) of the total migration. This evidence conforms with 
Krugman & Livas-Elizondo (1996) and Baylis et al (2012) that increased trade can lead to dispersion 
of economic activity and migrants out of Mexico City and into the northern Border States.  
Figures 5 and 6 show the net migration in 1990 and 2000, respectively. The black color shows 
states that are net receivers of migrants, whereas the white color is net senders. The darker colors 
denote the states with higher percentages of migrants that arrived, whereas the lighter colors denote 
the states with higher percentages of migrants that left.  The percentage is based on the total number 
of internal migrants that changed residence 5 years before that year.  
As observed, the D.F., Veracruz and the southern states (Guerrero, Oaxaca and Chiapas) are the 
main source of migrant workers. Veracruz increased its out-migration from 4% in 1990 to 6% in 
2000. The main receivers are the states surrounding the D.F. (Mexico and Morelos), all the northern 
Border States, except for Coahuila, and the touristic state of Quintana Roo. Since NAFTA, many 
industries decided to relocate in the state of Mexico and the northern Border States. Hanson (1998a) 
argues there has been a cluster of economic activity created along the U.S. border, especially in the 
manufacturing sector, which has led to the decline of Mexico City's manufacturing belt since the 
mid-1980s. Firms facing overcrowding and congestion in Mexico City relocated to nearby states 
(Rodríguez-Pose & Sánchez-Reaza, 2005). As a result, many people are leaving Mexico City and 
relocating to states that have increased significantly their economic growth during this decade. Thus, 
trade leads to more migration because the U.S. market appears to be increasing in importance, 
whereas the domestic market represented by Mexico City is perhaps less important after NAFTA. 
Another reason for this increase of migration to regions with high economic growth is the 
concept of churning where young and fast-growing firms get involved in a process of hiring and 
laying off workers; due to old industries are closed and new ones are created (Duranton, 2007). 
Normally this process begins with the labor market inside the region, but eventually these same 
firms start attracting migrants from other regions (Combes, Mayer, & Thisse, 2008). Regions 
involved in a high level of churning are mainly the ones receiving most of the internal migration 
(Hamalainen & Bockerman, 2004; Harris & Trainor, 2005).  
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I observe regional churning of migrants in some of these states. These are regions showing large 
numbers of both in and out-migration, which is the main channel of adjustment of labor markets 
(Duranton, 2007; Blanchard, et al., 1992). These states show low levels of net migration, or close to 
zero, but inside the state there is high migration churning. In 1990, some of these states were Puebla, 
Jalisco, Guanajuato, Michoacán, Oaxaca and Veracruz, and in 2000, Puebla, Jalisco, Michoacán, and 
Sinaloa (see Table 6 and 7 in the appendix). 
Figure 5:  Net Migration 1990 
 
 
Figure 6: Net Migration 2000 
 
Source: INEGI (2005) and author’s calculation. Light colors represent low net immigration and dark colors high. 
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Despite the importance of flexible labor markets for distributing gains from trade, the migration 
literature has not given much attention to the relationship between trade and internal migration 
(Borjas, The economic analysis of immigration, 1999). Therefore, the main question addressed in 
this chapter is whether or not trade liberalization changed the internal migration pattern, and second, 
whether migration characteristics such as ethnicity, education, population, land, etc. facilitate or 
hinder that migration (Aroca & Maloney, Migration, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in 
Mexico, 2005; Cornelius & Martin, 1993; Filipski, Taylor, & Msangi, 2011). Research aimed at 
providing relevant social policy recommendations should take these characteristics into 
consideration when identifying the best strategies to open their markets to international trade in 
their different sectors. Some of these strategies are as follows: improve infrastructure, increase the 
average wage and attract more manufacturing firms. These strategies will improve welfare and 
reduce poverty, decrease income inequality and lower regional disparities. Therefore, this chapter 
hopes to shed light on the movements of labor supply caused by international trade and its effect on 
regional inequalities. 
 
3.3. A Migration Model 
 
All sectors and regions of a country do not grow at the same time; sectors in some of the regions 
expand first, acquiring more productive economic processes in order to reach higher efficiency 
levels (van den Berg & Kemp, 2008). These leading regions require more labor to continue their 
development.  Once the available local labor supply is employed, these regions require migrant 
workers to meet their demand for labor, creating an internal migration from regions less developed 
to those leading productive regions.  International trade generates unequal growth by increasing the 
market for exporting sectors, and contracting those of import-competing industries. These industries 
are often located in different regions of the country. 
Before proceeding to the migration model, it is necessary to conceptualize the decision process 
an individual takes before considering to migrate. An individual weighs both the economic and non-
economic factors before making his decision whether to migrate. In time t-1 the worker will weigh 
the expected utility of staying against the expected utility from migrating. 
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Staying   Vs.    Migrating 
                  Vs.                        
In every time period, he considers the wage he will get in time t if stays in his own region i (wit ) 
against the wage he might  receive in time t if he migrates to region j ( wjt ). The expected utility also 
includes the amenities he can get by staying ( ait ) compared to the ones he can get by migrating ( ajt ). 
Another factor to consider is the transportation cost he will incur if he migrates from region i to j 
(TCij). The transportation cost is a function of variables such as distance between regions i and j, and 
a border crossing variable that captures whether he needs to cross the international border to arrive 
to region j: 
TCij = f (distanceij, border crossing) 
However in time t-1, the wages for time t are unknown and he faces a distribution of jobs, each 
with a given wage and given probability, in the next period. To estimate the future wages, he 
calculates the expected value of both wages in time t: 
        ∫                          
 
   
    where k= i and j 
The expected value of the wage in region k in time t is a function of the current wage in time t-1 
plus the expected increase of wages (Δwk) in region k from time t-1 to time t. This equation is 
multiplied by the probability of being employed at those wages in region k in time t, P(jobkt). The 
probability of getting a job in region k,         , is a function of variables like unemployment, and 
population density. This equation is integrated over the possible jobs (r) the individual can have in 
region k.  Note that if the individual is risk averse, holding the mean constant, an increase in the 
variance of wage outcomes in a region will reduce the expected utility associated with living in that 
region. 
The expected value of the change in wage from time t to t-1, is assumed to be a function of 
changes in regional Gross Value Added (GVA), (ΔGk), which at the same time is function of 
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characteristics of the region, variables such as distance to the market,16 trade openness, and industrial 
structure in region k (Zk): 
E(Δwk) = f (ΔGk( ΔZk)) 
To identify the specific effect of trade through its effect on GVA, I use a two-stage-least-squares 
(2SLS) approach. In the first stage, equation 4, I estimate the change in regional GVA since 1985 
caused by trade openness. I run this estimation at the district level (destination region) to predict the 
change in GVA       ̂  caused by trade with the United States, and then I aggregate the results to 
get the state level effect. To capture trade openness, I include the measures of the GVA for three 
different sectors (commerce, manufacturing and mining) in period t-1 (        ) multiplied by the 
change on tariffs in the respective sector (     . This interaction term captures the potential growth 
or contraction in regional GVA associated with a reduction in tariffs (             ). I include 
the annual average number of maquiladora establishments by district (         ), since the 
maquiladora program was aimed to attract foreign direct investment in the production of exportable 
goods (Fernández-Kelly, 2007).  A continuous variable of the road distance (in thousands of 
kilometers) from the capital of region i to the closest U.S. border crossing point is included (distF) to 
capture the influence of the proximity to the United States market. The model also includes the 
interaction variables of Δ              for every sector with       . 
equation 4 
      =                             +             
In the second stage, equation 5, migration from state i to district j is estimated using a Gravity 
Model. The number of migrants that migrate from i to j within the last 5 years is given as     . The 
origin-specific factors, pushing migrants to the corresponding areas in period t-1, are given as      . 
The destination-specific factors pulling migrants from the corresponding areas in period t-1 are 
given as       . The distance between i and j which affects migration according to some monotonic 
inverse function f( ) is given as               and            
 
   . The distance from the 
destination place to the nearest border crossing point of the US-Mexico border is given as       . 
                                                 
16
 The closer to the market, the higher the wage (Hanson G. , Localization economies, vertical organization, and 
trade, 1996). 
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Finally, the estimated differences in GVA with respect to 1985 caused by trade openness      ̂  
for the origin (i) and the destination (j) are included. 
equation 5 
  (    )                                                
 
           
        ̂         ̂      
Combining the different migration and the standard trade theories, I generate the following 
testable hypotheses: 
H1: Internal migrants are attracted to regions with growth spurred by trade. This will be observed 
by having a positive relationship between destination states that were more positively impacted by 
trade and higher economic growth.  
A supplementary hypothesis is that traded sectors, like manufacturing, were more influenced by 
NAFTA because they presented more economic growth than non-traded sectors. This would be 
observed by having a positive relationship between destination regions with higher traded sectors 
and higher openness to trade.   
 H2: Labor movement from Mexico to the United States dropped after NAFTA, because there 
was more labor demand in Mexico with trade openness, which reduced the incentive to migrate to 
the United States. Alternatively, as Audley et al. (2004) mention, the agreement created a “hump” of 
migration, which would actually increase migration after NAFTA due to a large number of Mexican 
labor displaced by the economic restructuring.  
H3: Finally, income distribution created a potential barrier to internal migration. Regions with 
high income disparities tended to have more out-migration whereas places with less income 
disparities received more migration (Connell, 1983).  
 
3.4. Data 
 
The migration flows are at state to district levels: The origin is at the state level, with 32 states, 
whereas the destination is at the district level, with 170 districts. INEGI presents this information at 
41 
 
the state and municipal level, for the origin and destination, receptively. But this level of information 
produced a large number of zero flows which skew the data, and can bias the estimated coefficients 
(LeSage & Pace, Spatial Econometric Modeling of Origen-Destination Flows, 2008). The percentage 
of zero observations at the state-muni levels was 54%, whereas at state-district level it reduces to 
5%. To collapse the destination data from muni to electoral district level, I use the information 
provided by the Secretariat of Governance (SEGOB, 2005) where it describes what municipalities 
belong to which electoral districts. This new level provides a standard destination level across the 
country. 
I collect the data on internal migration flows, demographics, infrastructure, distances (proxy for 
migration cost), GVA, labor markets and on tariffs. These data are collected from the economic and 
population censuses from the INEGI. Variables are defined in Table 5. Summary statistics are 
provided in Table 8 in the appendix. 
Table 5 Variables Used in the Model 
Variable Name Description 
    Log(Migration flow from i to j 5 years before) 
GVA in 1985 GVA from 1985 in real 2003 pesos for all the sectors 
GVA_hat The difference in GVA with respect to 1985’s GVA that is explained by trade 
GVA Commerce GVA in Commerce sector in real 2003 Mexican pesos 
GVA Manufacturing GVA in Manufacturing sector in real 2003 Mexican pesos 
GVA Mining GVA in Mining sector in real 2003 Mexican pesos 
Tariff Commerce % Tariff in Commerce Sector 
Tariff Manufacturing % Tariff in Manufacturing Sector 
Tariff Mining % Tariff in Mining Sector 
Border Distance Log (Road Distance from the District head to the nearest border crossing point) 
O-D Distance Log(Distance between receiving and sending regions in Kms) 
O-D Distance squared Log(Distance between receiving and sending regions in Kms) squared 
Population Density Population per squared kilometer 
Maquila Number of maquiladora establishments in the region 
D-O Difference on Remuneration 
per Worker 
Difference between Destination and Origin lagged Remuneration per worker (in 
thousands of real 2003 pesos) 
<2 minimum salaries Lagged % labor force with 0 - 2 Minimum Salaries 
2-10 minimum salaries Lagged % labor force with 2 -10 Minimum Salaries 
>10 minimum salaries Lagged % labor force with more than 10 Minimum Salaries 
Infrastructure Lagged principal component variable of % of households with electricity, water 
and sewage 
Own House Lagged % households that owned their homes 
Fertility Rate Lagged Fertility Rate 
% Women Lagged % of Women population 
District City Dummy variable for Destination Districts>500,000 inhabitants 
Total Population Lagged Ln Total Population  
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Migration Flow (   ): Migration data come from the 1990, 2000 Population Censuses and the 
2005 Population Count from a question that asks residents of a district in what states or country the 
interviewee resided five years earlier. Though this approach might be standard, these data have the 
drawback of failing to count migrants who might have left and returned over the five-year period. 
Flows to the United States derived from a question asking whether a member of the household has 
gone to the United States during the last 5 years and has not returned and are obtained from the 
National Population Council (CONAPO).  
GVA: To control for regions that had a high level of economic activity before NAFTA, I include 
their GVA for 1985. I also include the estimated change in regional GVA with respect to 1985 
explained by trade to observe the effect of NAFTA on internal migration. These data are also 
obtained from the INEGI’s economic censuses. 
GVA sectors: I also include the measurements of the GVA for three different sectors 
(commerce, manufacturing and mining) in period t-1 for the origin and destination areas. These data 
are obtained from the INEGI’s economic censuses. 
Tariffs: Trade openness was not the same across all sectors. Some sectors reduced tariffs faster 
than others (Aguayo-Tellez, Airola, & Juhn, 2010). Therefore, to identify the effect that NAFTA had 
on internal migration, I use the different tariffs available for the different sectors. These data are 
obtained from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC). I use the data available, 
at an annual frequency, of the U.S. tariffs on Mexican exports at the 1-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) level for the light/heavy manufactured, mining and intermediate goods, which I 
match to the manufacturing, mining and commerce sectors, respectively. These tariffs are aggregated 
across different goods on each sector and weighted by their respective trade volumes. 
Transportation cost (distF): Road distance (in thousands of kilometers) from district ‘i’ to the 
closest U.S. border crossing point, same as in stage 1. I consider that economic growth, and as a 
result internal migration, will be correlated with transportation cost to the U.S. border, which I 
proxy by road distance from the capital of district ‘i’ to the closest border crossing point. To create 
the border distance variable, distF, I first obtain the name of the district or state capitals (INEGI, 
2008). Second, I calculate the road distance from each of the district or states capitals to the 
different U.S. border crossing points, by entering the destination and origin points in the webpage 
“Traza tu Ruta” provided by the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes (2008). Finally, I chose 
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the shortest distance for each district or state capital from the different distances provided by each 
border crossing point. For district capitals that do not appear as origin points, I calculate the 
distance of the nearest available city or town and add the road distance from that point to the district 
capital of interest, which I calculate manually by using a map of Mexico. 
Moving Cost                and            
 
   : Based on the literature, transportation 
costs are best approximated by using a quadratic function of the distance between the origin and 
destination (Greenwood, International Migration in Developed Countries, 1997; Aroca & Maloney, 
Migration, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico, 2005). I use as origin the state where the 
person leaved 5 years before and as destination the district where the person migrated during the last 
5 years. This proxy includes the moving cost, which increases as the length of the distance increases, 
and the communication costs with their family in the place of origin, including the cost to visit them. 
Previous literature assumes a negative effect of distance. That said, the greater the distance, the less 
the level of migration. 
Population density: Greenwood (International Migration in Developed Countries, 1997) 
mentions that migration is directly related to the population size of the origin and destination places, 
since the larger the origin and destination, the higher the number of people migrating from that 
origin to that destination. Thus, I control for the population size because regions with larger 
concentrations of people will tend to have more in- and out-migration. In this case, I use the 
population density (population per squared kilometer) that districts and states report, including 
children and elderly, in every population census. 
Maquiladoras: Since maquiladoras had early tariff-free access to the United States, they have long 
attract migrants (Cravey, 1998).  Therefore, I include a control variable which is the number of 
maquiladora establishments in the region. The maquila variable is created by calculating the annual 
average from the monthly number of establishments in the relevant region provided by the 
Estadística de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportación, (INEGI, 2007). Although this approach is 
standard, it has the drawback of failing to count the size of the maquiladoras. 
Labor markets: Remuneration per worker is generated as total remuneration paid17 in a 
district/state divided by the number of workers registered in that year for that region. The 
                                                 
17
 Remunerations are presented in real thousand pesos from 2003 
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percentage of labor force earning X number of minimum salaries is generated by taking the number 
of participating workers earning an X number of minimum salaries and dividing it by the total labor 
force. This information was collected in the 1989, 1999 and 2004 economic censuses by the 
National Institute of Statistic and Geography (INEGI). It is important to note that the remuneration 
per worker is calculated taking the total number of people working whereas the percentage of labor 
force earning certain percentages of the  minimum salary is calculated taking the total labor force, 
which includes the unemployed. 
Infrastructure: Investment in infrastructure provided by the local governments plays an 
important role in the migration decision since people tend to migrate from places with low levels of 
infrastructure and to places with high levels of infrastructure. This infrastructure reflects the 
amenities available in the destination area, implying a positive relation with migration decisions 
(Aroca & Maloney, Migration, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico, 2005). Thus, better 
infrastructure will shape the decision to migrate (Lucas, 1997). Therefore, I include the percentage of 
households with water, electricity and sewage. This information was obtained from the INEGI’s 
population censuses. 
Own a house: Percentage of population that owns a house may reflect the probability that people 
will have to rent a place in the destination region. However, it might also reflect a cost of moving 
because people who own their houses will be less likely to migrate, and give up the local capital 
when they move (Greenwood, International Migration in Developed Countries, 1997).  
Fertility and Women: Little has been done to study the correlation of migration with fertility and 
women. However, the literature mentions that destination regions tend to have lower fertility rates 
than the origin (LaLonde & Topel, 1997) and also that migrants will go to places with high female 
labor force participation (Mincer, 1978). Thus, I use the fertility rate and the percentage of women 
as proxies at the origin and destination to control for these effects. This information has been 
obtained from the INEGI’s population census. 
Urban areas (District City): Because the INEGI does not provide the GVA in the agricultural 
sector for the same periods included in this analysis, I cannot observe rural migration before and 
after NAFTA. Therefore, I create a dummy variable for those destination places with more than 
500,000 inhabitants (Anzaldo Gómez, Hernández Esquivel, & Rivera Vázquez, 2008), which will 
allow me to distinguish urban from rural migration. 
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3.5. Results 
 
1st Stage 
In the first stage I regress the changes in district GVA against drivers associated with trade.  Table 
9 reports the panel regression results from the first stage for GVA at the district level18. I regress the 
difference in GVA with respect to 1985 caused by trade openness. Column 1 shows the regression 
at the district level, where most variables are significant at the 1% level. The interaction variable of 
the sectoral GVA with the change in tariff in that sector                            is significant 
for all the sectors. The variable distance to the border         is not significant by itself, but its 
interactions with the sectoral GVA                            are significant for all sectors. 
Finally, the maquiladora variable is positive and significant, well within the range in previous 
literature (Baylis, Garduño-Rivera, & Piras, 2012; Fernández-Kelly, 2007; Rodríguez-Pose & 
Sánchez-Reaza, 2005) where maquiladora establishments attracted investment and increased the 
production of exportable goods and, as a result, the region’s GVA will be higher.  
Table 11 reports the marginal effects of a change in distance         and tariffs      after 
NAFTA. I find that a decrease of one percent of tariffs, ceteris paribus, contributes to a 0.87% lower 
economic growth in commerce and a 0.18% and 1.47% higher economic growth in manufacturing 
and mining, respectively. Thus, a region will have a higher economic growth in manufacturing and 
mining with tariff reductions after NAFTA. 
 
2nd Stage 
Table 10 reports the regression results using multiple spatial cross sectional data for 5,440 
observations related to 170 destination districts, 32 origin Mexican states and the United States over 
3 years (1990, 2000 and 2005)19.  I did a spatial multiple cross- section regression of the number of 
migrants who moved from state i to district j against various characteristics to see whether the 
influence of these characteristics changed after NAFTA. I find substantial spatial correlation in the 
error terms for both the spatial-error and spatial-lag cross-section regression, with the degree of 
                                                 
18
 To obtain the state results for the origin places, I aggregate the district results. 
19
 I am not using data from 1995 because INEGI did not gather information about migration in the Conteo de 
Poblacion y Vivienda 1995. 
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spatial correlation in the errors (λ) ranging from 0.29 to 0.77. The Robust Lagrange Multiplier test 
shows that the spatial-lag model is the most appropriate model to use. Therefore, the results 
presented below are generated from spatial-lag model (Table 10).  
For this gravity model the spatial weight matrix I use is a destination-base dependence matrix20. 
Lesage and Pace (Spatial Econometric Modeling of Origen-Destination Flows, 2008) find that this 
type of dependence reflects that forces leading to flows from an origin to a destination may create 
similar flows to nearby or neighboring destinations. Griffith and Jones (Explorations into the 
Relationship Between Spatial Structure and Spatial Interaction, 1980) also find that flows related to a 
destination are “enhanced or diminished” based on the attractiveness of its neighboring destination 
locations. Therefore, this N by N spatial weight matrix Wd shows the relation between an origin and 
neighbors destinations.  
Starting with model 1, columns 1 to 3, I can observe that the change in GVA from 1985 
explained by trade (GVA_hat) is positive and significant for the destination regions for all the years 
(1990, 2000 and 2005). This result finds support in our first hypothesis that internal migrants are 
attracted to regions with growth spurred by trade because the maquiladora project, the GATT and 
the NAFTA agreement have attracted labor. However, it is interesting to note that the effect 
decreases substantially over time, showing that most of the trade-driven effect on internal migration 
happened before NAFTA, perhaps driven by Mexico’s participation in the GATT. The 
supplementary hypothesis deals with destination regions with higher traded sectors. From stage 1, I 
observe that in fact, regions with more traded sectors such as manufacturing and mining benefited 
more from trade openness. As a result these regions with a higher traded sector attracted more 
internal migration. 
In model 2, columns 4-6, I include the Mexico-U.S. migration, treating the United States as the 
33rd Mexican state and create a dummy variable which identifies this migration to the United States. 
These coefficients are positive and significant in years 2000 and 2005 indicating that migration to the 
United States actually increased after NAFTA. Thus, I can reject our second hypothesis that 
migration from Mexico to the United States dropped after NAFTA. This result is consistent with 
the idea that the agreement will create a “hump” of migration which will actually increase migration 
after NAFTA due to a large number of Mexican labor displaced by the economic restructuring 
                                                 
20
 I also tried a origin-based matrix, and found that the spatial effects were quite small. 
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(Audley, Demetrios, Polaski, & Vaughan, 2004). This evidence supports the alternative hypothesis 
because migration to the United States has increased substantially after NAFTA, even after the 
IIRIRA21 Act in 1996 which significantly tightened border enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico 
border and was expected to reduce considerably the flow of unauthorized migrants (Hanson G. H., 
The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration, 2007). 
Turning to the third hypothesis, I include the variables to capture income disparity (model 3 and 
4, columns 7-12). Specifically, I include the percentage of the labor force earning less than twice the 
minimum wage (D_<2 minimum salaries) and the percentage of labor force receiving more than ten 
minimum salaries on the destination location (D_>10 minimum salaries), omitting the percentage of 
labor force receiving between 2 to 10 minimum salaries (D_2-10 minimum salaries).22 I run two models 
with the income distribution variables, one with the Mexico-U.S. migration (model 4) and one 
without (model 3), in order to observe if the results changed when I included the Mexico-U.S. 
migration. Coefficients on the percentage of the labor force earning less than twice and the percent 
earning more than ten the minimum wage are significant, and their signs are negative in all the 
specifications involving the destination location. This means that destinations with a higher fraction 
of the working-age population receiving less than twice or more than ten minimum salaries are not 
drawing migrants. The negative effect of the labor force receiving more than ten minimum salaries, 
in the destination location, decreases almost in half over time, whereas the effect of the labor force 
earning less than two minimum salaries increased (for the regression including Mexico-U.S. 
migration, columns 10-12). This result indicates that recipient regions with more workers earning 
less than 2 minimum will deter migration more after NAFTA; whereas destination regions with 
more workers receiving more than ten minimum salaries are starting to attract more migrants after 
NAFTA (column 10-12). These two variables for the origin places are also significant with a 
negative sign in all the specifications. The negative sign is consistent with the hypothesis that a base 
level of wages is required to be able to leave, and that only workers with more than 2 or less than 10 
minimum salaries will migrate to places with less income disparity; that is, places with a higher 
percentage of labor force receiving between 2 to 10 minimum salaries. These two variables also 
changed drastically over time, especially in 2000, meaning that the deterrent of income disparity 
decreased after NAFTA. Further, note that this effect holds for both receiving and sending 
                                                 
21
 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
22
 I do not have detailed individual income data at the district level, so I cannot calculate a more detailed measure of 
income distribution. 
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locations; that is, income disparity appears to not only be a deterrent to moving to a location, it also 
acts as a barrier to leaving which differs from Connell’s (Migration remittances and rural 
development in the South Pacific, 1983)’s finding that migration will happen due to income 
disparity. 
The difference in remuneration per worker between the destination and origin regions shows an 
interesting effect. Before NAFTA, destination regions with a higher remuneration were attracting 
more migrants whereas, after NAFTA, the remuneration effect is not a pull force anymore. The 
coefficient on the variable changes sign in 2000. I attribute this change due to sharp peso crisis 
Mexico had after signing NAFTA, which increased unemployment23 as well as caused a 25 percent 
drop in wages (Aroca & Maloney, Migration, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico, 
2005). Thus, finding a job was as important as finding a well- paying job. 
The cost of movement variable –distance from origin to destination (O-D Distance and O-D 
Distance squared)—is significant in all the specifications but the coefficients have an opposite sign 
than those found in previous literature (Borjas, Economics of Migration, 2000; LeSage & Llano, A 
Spatial Interaction Model With Spatially Structured Origin and Destination Effects, 2007; Massey, 
1990; LeSage J. P., 2010). The tipping point increases over time: I calculate a tipping point of about 
86kms in 1990 to 94kms in 2005. In the case of Mexico, there is a large labor migration from the 
south to the north of Mexico, especially from rural to urban regions (Aguayo Tellez, 2005).The 
increase in the tipping point from 1990 to 2005 shows that better roads and economical bus services 
have lowered the cost of movement (Sahota, 1968). 
Finally, the coefficient on infrastructure is, as expected in an amenity, is significant in all the 
specifications and with a positive coefficient on the destination and negative coefficient on the 
origin. This evidence supports the literature where the level of infrastructure has a pull effect, which 
attracts migrants to regions with higher levels of infrastructure, and it is also a reason to abandon a 
region with low level of infrastructure. One important finding is that the effect of infrastructure as a 
draw decreases significantly after NAFTA while it increases as a push. These results reinforce the 
importance of infrastructure on the migration decision, which gains strength as a push factor after 
NAFTA. 
                                                 
23
 As mentioned before, the remuneration per worker is calculated taking the total number of people working 
whereas the percentage of labor force earning X number of minimum salaries is calculated taking the total labor 
force, which includes the unemployed. 
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Demographic Variables 
The total population of the destination location (Total Population) is significant and with a positive 
sign in all the specifications, a result consistent with the market size. The coefficient on the origin 
population (O_Total Population) is stable with a positive sign across all the specifications.  
The dummy variable for destination districts with more than 500,000 inhabitants (District City) is 
only significant for the year 2005. This agrees with the urban-centric literature that mentions that 
people tend to migrate from the country side to cities (Kearney, 1986). But the most interesting 
finding is that this effect gains importance only after NAFTA, which shows the growth that urban 
areas gained migrants after NAFTA (Baylis, Garduño-Rivera, & Piras, 2012; Aroca, Bosch, & 
Maloney, 2005). 
The percentage of households that owned their homes is both significant and negative on the 
destination as well as the origin locations. This is consistent with the idea that migration flows will 
tend to go to places where there are more chances to rent a house and will tend to happen when the 
person does not own a house. The coefficient on the origin location is not significant for the 
specifications run without US observations. 
The fertility rate and the percentage of women are negative and significant across all the 
specifications and in both type of locations, origin and destination. It does appear that migration 
flows are largely from and to places with lower percentages of women and lower fertility. Note that 
also, the majority of internal migrants are men (Lucas, 1997). One interesting thing is to observe 
how the effects of these factors decrease their magnitude over time. Only the fertility rate in the 
destination does not follow this trend. 
I test for robustness of these results to different specifications. First, I run Model 4 without the 
U.S. observations, and the results are qualitatively unchanged. Second, I run the regression as spatial-
error model, and the results are again robust. Last, I run the regression as a non-spatial data and 
obtain qualitatively similar results.  
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3.6. Conclusions 
 
This chapter contributes to the understanding of the mechanisms of labor adjustment, an 
important aspect of economic development. It also demonstrates how trade openness has 
influenced this labor adjustment; specifically, whether or not migration within Mexico, particularly to 
urban areas and to the United States, increased after NAFTA.  
At the beginning of this chapter, I asked whether NAFTA increased internal migration but 
reduced migration to the United States. My results show that trade openness has increased internal 
migration, but this effect diminishes over time, confirming that much of the trade-generated 
migration happened before Mexico joined the NAFTA. In the same form, the flow of migrants to 
the United States has increased due to the pull caused by the U.S. economy overcoming the 
transportation cost to get to the United States, especially in the years following the NAFTA 
agreement (Luckstead, Devadoss, & Rodriguez, 2012). Thus, I see evidence of a “hump” of 
migration to the United States as proposed by Audley, et al. (2004), as the large number of Mexicans 
displaced by economic restructuring would lead temporarily to more migration.  
The results indicate that trade liberalization has not reduced internal migration, but instead led to 
a greater labor adjustment within Mexico. Migration to urban areas has also increased. Places with 
higher levels of infrastructure will attract workers since this will provide a better standard of living. 
Also, income inequality is both a barrier to leaving and a deterrent to in-migration, and this effect 
persists after NAFTA. 
The analysis in this chapter confirms that trade has indeed increased internal migration along with 
increasing the flow of migrants to the United States. But it also shows what other factors, i.e. the 
maquiladora project, have contributed to increased internal migration. The management of these 
factors by local governments will allow the creation of regional development policies to reduce out 
migration (from a region concerned with losing their manpower) or to increase immigration (in a 
region interested in attracting more labor supply). In this chapter I find that regions with significant 
income disparities are not able to attract migration flows but that local governments that invest in 
basic infrastructure are able to attract migration flows and, more importantly, will not have a net out 
migration. Further research is necessary to determine what other factors influence internal migration 
and are likely to shape the next phase of Mexico’s regional development.  
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3.7. Tables 
Table 6: Regional churning of migrants by state in 1990 
      Receiving  Sending Net-Migration 
State Total Not Migrant # 
As % of 
Migration # 
As % of 
Migration # 
As % of 
Migration 
México 8,563,538 7,715,847 787,020 23% 271,421 8% 515,599 15% 
Baja California 1,425,801 1,178,743 220,848 6% 40,309 1% 180,539 5% 
Chihuahua 2,118,557 1,978,526 118,343 3% 40,146 1% 78,197 2% 
Quintana Roo 412,868 314,471 92,895 3% 18,969 1% 73,926 2% 
Morelos 1,048,065 950,127 91,322 3% 39,613 1% 51,709 1% 
Nuevo León 2,750,624 2,616,715 114,049 3% 66,247 2% 47,802 1% 
Jalisco 4,584,728 4,359,271 178,259 5% 138,366 4% 39,893 1% 
Tamaulipas 1,974,755 1,843,870 115,424 3% 75,599 2% 39,825 1% 
Querétaro 898,199 823,330 67,976 2% 29,264 1% 38,712 1% 
Aguascalientes 619,401 570,895 44,012 1% 17,452 1% 26,560 1% 
Sonora 1,596,063 1,508,975 72,307 2% 53,840 2% 18,467 1% 
Baja California Sur 275,985 243,260 29,539 1% 11,735 0% 17,804 1% 
Colima 371,876 337,232 31,123 1% 18,356 1% 12,767 0% 
Tlaxcala 662,426 623,570 35,906 1% 25,028 1% 10,878 0% 
Campeche 456,452 418,566 34,500 1% 24,697 1% 9,803 0% 
Guanajuato 3,396,283 3,266,666 98,926 3% 94,976 3% 3,950 0% 
Nayarit 711,691 669,150 35,934 1% 38,769 1% -2,835 0% 
Tabasco 1,288,222 1,230,380 47,965 1% 54,412 2% -6,447 0% 
Yucatán 1,188,433 1,143,643 38,395 1% 47,384 1% -8,989 0% 
Coahuila 1,730,829 1,650,636 69,278 2% 80,748 2% -11,470 0% 
Puebla 3,565,924 3,416,498 126,056 4% 139,132 4% -13,076 0% 
San Luis Potosí 1,723,605 1,642,499 64,531 2% 77,650 2% -13,119 0% 
Michoacán 3,037,340 2,896,080 106,146 3% 121,134 3% -14,988 0% 
Hidalgo 1,628,542 1,548,781 67,114 2% 85,909 2% -18,795 -1% 
Sinaloa 1,923,515 1,825,563 83,139 2% 105,330 3% -22,191 -1% 
Chiapas 2,710,283 2,638,242 43,947 1% 69,824 2% -25,877 -1% 
Zacatecas 1,100,898 1,051,465 36,731 1% 68,784 2% -32,053 -1% 
Durango 1,169,332 1,117,969 41,301 1% 82,359 2% -41,058 -1% 
Oaxaca 2,602,479 2,511,418 74,083 2% 138,780 4% -64,697 -2% 
Veracruz 5,424,172 5,228,654 163,924 5% 236,281 7% -72,357 -2% 
Guerrero 2,228,077 2,159,919 46,959 1% 120,236 3% -73,277 -2% 
Distrito Federal 7,373,239 7,020,558 299,285 9% 1,035,758 30% -736,473 -21% 
USA         126,486 4%     
         
Total 70,562,202 66,501,519 3,477,237 100% 3,477,237 100% 0 0% 
         
The blue colors show the top 5 states receivers of migrants, whereas the red colors are the top 5 states senders. 
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Table 7: Regional churning of migrants by state in 2000 
      Receiving  Sending Net-Migration 
State Total Residents # 
As % of 
Migration # 
As % of 
Migration # 
As % of 
Migration 
México 11,097,516 10,353,640 688,200 19% 438,970 12% 249,230 7% 
Baja California 2,010,869 1,740,820 229,547 6% 64,966 2% 164,581 5% 
Tamaulipas 2,427,309 2,242,226 164,697 5% 69,164 2% 95,533 3% 
Chihuahua 2,621,057 2,450,504 138,616 4% 49,694 1% 88,922 2% 
Quintana Roo 755,442 625,774 123,574 3% 35,872 1% 87,702 2% 
Nuevo León 3,392,025 3,239,025 128,902 4% 66,925 2% 61,977 2% 
Querétaro 1,224,088 1,137,537 78,652 2% 32,422 1% 46,230 1% 
Morelos 1,334,892 1,239,182 83,614 2% 48,982 1% 34,632 1% 
Baja California Sur 374,215 330,561 40,339 1% 15,888 0% 24,451 1% 
Sonora 1,956,617 1,862,929 77,072 2% 55,486 2% 21,586 1% 
Guanajuato 4,049,950 3,922,657 94,420 3% 75,176 2% 19,244 1% 
Tlaxcala 846,877 803,801 39,436 1% 26,573 1% 12,863 0% 
Jalisco 5,541,480 5,322,614 155,237 4% 142,660 4% 12,577 0% 
Colima 457,777 421,069 30,741 1% 20,853 1% 9,888 0% 
Hidalgo 1,973,968 1,876,884 86,888 2% 78,527 2% 8,361 0% 
Campeche 606,699 570,757 33,873 1% 28,524 1% 5,349 0% 
Coahuila 2,018,053 1,929,877 72,981 2% 68,591 2% 4,390 0% 
Yucatán 1,472,683 1,422,300 44,554 1% 43,575 1% 979 0% 
Total 84,794,454 80,565,026 3,584,957 100% 3,584,957 100% 0 0% 
Nayarit 815,263 768,930 36,772 1% 41,057 1% -4,285 0% 
Zacatecas 1,188,724 1,139,015 33,121 1% 45,706 1% -12,585 0% 
Michoacán 3,479,357 3,341,540 94,038 3% 107,161 3% -13,123 0% 
Puebla 4,337,362 4,179,456 131,109 4% 150,373 4% -19,264 -1% 
San Luis Potosí 2,010,539 1,945,855 50,898 1% 73,711 2% -22,813 -1% 
Sinaloa 2,241,298 2,130,225 96,899 3% 122,258 3% -25,359 -1% 
Durango 1,264,011 1,212,364 38,362 1% 65,057 2% -26,695 -1% 
Tabasco 1,664,366 1,614,643 43,815 1% 73,612 2% -29,797 -1% 
Chiapas 3,288,963 3,222,193 45,240 1% 89,244 2% -44,004 -1% 
Oaxaca 3,019,103 2,923,845 76,764 2% 139,705 4% -62,941 -2% 
Guerrero 2,646,132 2,572,010 52,632 1% 139,616 4% -86,984 -2% 
Veracruz 6,118,108 5,941,172 155,031 4% 374,545 10% -219,514 -6% 
Distrito Federal 7,738,307 7,309,269 376,494 11% 780,312 22% -403,818 -11% 
USA         293,373 8%     
The blue colors show the top 5 states receivers of migrants, whereas the red colors are the top 5 states senders. 
 
 
53 
 
Table 8 Summary Statistics. Reported statistics are mean, (standard errors), and [minimum, maximum] values. 
  Destination (district level) Origin (state level) 
Year 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005 
Obs 170 170 170 32 32 32 
Immigration  637      659  442  3,496  3,614  2,426  
(5,466) (4,927) (2,963) (18,465) (16,290) (9,963) 
[0;  311,103] [0; 269,565] [0; 166,890] [16; 548,974] [15; 448,546] [10; 280,644] 
GVA Total in millions of 2000 MXP 589  789  877  2,710  3,750  4,210  
(6,740) (9,310) (10,400) (15,400) (21,200) (23,700) 
[5;  88,200] [5;  122,000] [5; 136,000] [4,;  88,200] [6; 122,000] [6; 136,000] 
GVA Commerce in millions of 2000 MXP 12  14  14  421  570  602  
(17) (18) (18) (2,000) (2,810) (2,970) 
[1; 130] [1; 131] [1; 133] [8; 11,400] [8; 16,000] [9; 16,900] 
GVA Manufacturing in millions of 2000 MXP 71  72  73  837  923  914  
(99) (99) (99) (2,590) (3,040) (2,960) 
[5;  814] [5;  814] [5;  814] [30; 14,700] [35; 17,300] [35;  6,900] 
GVA Mining in millions of 2000 MXP 73  73  74  428  427  458  
(104) (104) (105) (556) (556) (605) 
[5;  865] [5;  865] [5; 865] [21; 2,920] [21; 2,920] [21; 2,920] 
Tariff Commerce (%) 0.039  0.026  0.017  0.039  0.026  0.017  
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
[0.039; 0.039] [0.026; 0.026] [0.017; 0.017] [0.039; 0.039] [0.026; 0.026] [0.017; 0.017] 
Tariff Manufacturing (%) 0.052  0.056  0.039  0.052  0.056  0.039  
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
[0.052; 0.052] [0.056; 0.056] [0.039; 0.039] [0.052; 0.052] [0.056; 0.056] [0.039; 0.039] 
Tariff Mining (%) 0.005  0.002  0.002  0.005  0.002  0.002  
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.00) (0.00) 
[0.005; 0.005] [0.002; 0.002] [0.002; 0.002] [0.005; 0.005] [0.002; 0.002] [0.002; 0.002] 
Border Distance 985  985  985  968  968  968  
(472.74) (472.74) (472.74) (491.96) (491.96) (491.96) 
[1; 2,322] [1; 2,322] [1; 2,322] [1; 2,004] [1; 2,004] [1; 2,004] 
Population Density per sq. km 200  228  230  242  267  268  
(1,095.95) (1,102.14) (1,065.92) (960.98) (1,003.89) (988.28) 
[1; 13,919] [1; 13,790] [2; 13,246] [4; 5,486] [6; 5,732] [7; 5,645] 
Maquila 8  12  11  42  61  57  
(44.29) (66.30) (59.36) (121.38) (181) (160) 
[0; 487] [0; 779] [0;  677] [0; 609] [0; 950] [0; 808] 
Remuneration per Worker 33  28  30  42  37  39  
(20.06) (16.54) (17.86) (12.13) (12.99) (13.95) 
[4; 106] [3;  95] [5; 101] [22; 64] [18; 73] [17; 71] 
% Labor Force with <2 Minimum Salaries 0.666  0.588  0.565  0.630  0.517  0.483  
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.13) (0.15) 
[0.328; 0.901] [0.213; 0.902] [0.140; 0.903] [0.400; 0.801] [0.222; 0.759] [0.176; 0.746] 
% Labor Force with 2-10 Minimum Salaries 0.265  0.334  0.355  0.302  0.396  0.424  
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.11) (0.13) 
[0.044; 0.544] [0.067; 0.646] [0.075; 0.708] [0.144; 0.512] [0.178; 0.633] [0.189; 0.667] 
% of Households with Sewers 0.508  0.675  0.804  0.596  0.753  0.863  
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.12) (0.09) 
[0.101; 0.951] [0.167; 0.975] [0.295; 0.987] [0.300; 0.940] [0.450; 1.000] [0.620; 1.000] 
% of Households with Electricity 0.813  0.910  0.951  0.863  0.929  0.963  
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.03) (0.02) 
[0.264; 0.990] [0.526; 0.985] [0.467; 0.990] [0.670; 1.000] [0.850; 1.000] [0.920; 1.000] 
% of Households with Water 0.730  0.780  0.835  0.787  0.831  0.882  
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.09) (0.09) 
[0.294; 0.970] [0.380; 0.971] [0.415; 0.985] [0.560; 0.950] [0.590; 0.960] [0.640; 1.000] 
% Households that owned their homes 0.809  0.804   0.792  0.789   
(0) (0) N/A (0) (0.05) N/A 
[0.625; 0.943] [0.580; 0.937]   [0.652; 0.883] [0.680; 0.868]   
Fertility Rate 3  3  3  3  3  3  
(0.37) (0.37) (0.35) (0.26) (0.24) (0.22) 
[2; 4] [2; 4] [2; 4] [2; 3] [2; 3] [2; 3] 
% of Women population 0.505  0.509  0.512  0.506  0.509  0.511  
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.01) (0.01) 
[0.476; 0.530] [0.473; 0.537] [0.476; 0.538] [0.483; 0.522] [0.488; 0.522] [0.490; 0.524] 
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Table 9   1st Stage: OLS regression for      
 (1) 
Place Destination 
                             -1.30e-08*** 
 (-5.92) 
                                       1.53e-09*** 
 (4.01) 
                         1.67e-08*** 
 (6.03) 
                                   1.06e-08*** 
 (4.57) 
                                             -1.16e-09*** 
 (-3.60) 
                               -1.26e-08*** 
 (-4.82) 
      -0.102 
 (-1.23) 
       0.0634 
 (1.69) 
        0.000998*** 
 (4.34) 
x1995 0.0196** 
 (2.78) 
x2000 0.0289*** 
 (5.14) 
x2005 0.0343*** 
 (8.29) 
Constant 0.0341 
 (0.76) 
  
N 684 
t-statistics in parentheses * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
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Table 10.  2nd Stage: Spatial Cross Section for ln(migration). Significance levels: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05 
Model  1 
Base Model  
w/o Mexico-U.S. migration 
2 
Base Model  
w/Mexico-U.S. migration 
Columns 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Year 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005 
(Intercept) 24.865** 25.553** 18.303** 13.737** 16.588** 13.738** 
O-D Distance 2.734** 2.684** 2.465** 2.682** 2.63** 2.413** 
O-D Distance squared -0.304** -0.295** -0.27** -0.297** -0.287** -0.262** 
Migrate to US      37.964 221.9** 223.96** 
District City -0.023 0.115 0.254** -0.03 0.087 0.235** 
D-O Diff. Remuneration 
per Worker  
0.006** 0.003 -0.001 0.006** 0.003* 0.001 
D_GVA_hat 6.143** 1.105* 0.822** 6.146** 1.195** 0.998** 
D_Infrastructure 0.257** 0.131** 0.15** 0.271** 0.149** 0.169** 
D_Total Population 0.889** 0.922** 0.884** 0.879** 0.918** 0.872** 
D_<2 minimum salaries           
D_>10 minimum salaries           
D_Own House -0.277 -2.97** -2.936** -0.461 -3.26** -3.176** 
D_Fertility Rate -0.51** -0.657** -0.808** -0.42** -0.522** -0.708** 
D_% Women -30.485** -29.491** -25.433** -27.576** -25.289** -23.27** 
O_GVA_hat -0.643** 0.965 0.375 -0.741 0.761* 0.092 
O_Infrastructure -0.061 -0.198** -0.273** 0.018 -0.11** -0.229** 
O_Total Population 1.078** 1.112** 1.112** 1.061** 1.085** 1.098** 
O_>2 minimum salaries           
O_>10 minimum salaries           
O_Own House -4.907** -5.904** -4.181** -0.096** -0.031** -0.045** 
O_Fertility Rate -0.763** -0.691** -0.411** -1.156** -1.105** -0.747** 
O_% Women -55.354** -54.711** -46.662** -40.542** -47.844** -44.233** 
       
λ 6.69E-34 -1.69E-33 -7.88E-34 9.30E-34 -1.59E-33 -2.84E-34 
N 5,440 5,440 5,440 5,643 5,643 5,643 
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Table 10 (cont.) 
Model  3 
Model with wage distribution but  
w/o Mexico-U.S. migration 
4 
Model with wage distribution 
 and Mexico-U.S. migration 
Columns 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Year 1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005 
(Intercept) 22.075** 23.117** 17.57** 13.198** 13.937** 11.421** 
O-D Distance 2.769** 2.692** 2.464** 2.727** 2.651** 2.42** 
O-D Distance squared -0.31** -0.296** -0.27** -0.304** -0.29** -0.263** 
Migrate to US      15.406 132.51** 136.6** 
District City -0.02 0.085 0.208** -0.043 0.08 0.224** 
D-O Diff. Remuneration 
per Worker  
0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.003** -0.0003 -0.001 
D_GVA_hat 4.696** 1.125** 1.003** 5.49** 0.967** 0.804** 
D_Infrastructure 0.276** -0.011 0.035 0.247** -0.001 0.008 
D_Total Population 0.95** 0.942** 0.853** 0.961** 0.941** 0.845** 
D_<2 minimum salaries -1.593** -3.348** -2.849** -1.696** -3.287** -2.811** 
D_>10 minimum salaries -5.506 -8.1** -4.862 -11.246** -9.645** -6.523* 
D_Own House -0.088 -1.553** -1.645** -0.019 -1.779** -1.796** 
D_Fertility Rate -0.471* -0.836** -0.861** -0.476** -0.722** -0.799** 
D_% Women -28.949** -29.686** -26.225** -28.298** -24.594** -21.754** 
O_GVA_hat 1.378 -0.135 -0.751** -0.702 0.225 -0.311* 
O_Infrastructure -0.202** -0.37** -0.442** -0.035 -0.386** -0.373** 
O_Total Population 1.132** 1.109** 1.033** 1.16** 1.087** 1.004** 
O_>2 minimum salaries -2.339** -3.651** -1.287* -2.757** -5.523** -2.123** 
O_>10 minimum salaries -15.822 -20.568** -5.949 -9.103** -27.525** -6.112 
O_Own House -3.738** -4.345** -3.155** -0.066** 0.121** -0.021 
O_Fertility Rate -0.934** -0.893** -0.448* -1.117** -1.388** -0.865** 
O_% Women -49.479** -42.027** -38.761** -37.219** -30.376** -32.15** 
       
λ -2.66E-33 -1.24E-34 8.87E-34 6.36E-34 -6.75E-34 3.29E-34 
N 5,440 5,440 5,440 5,643 5,643 5,643 
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Table 11 Marginal Effect of Change in Distance and Tariffs after NAFTA on GVA growth 
Marginal Effect Distance Tariff 
Commerce -0.067% 0.87% 
Manufacturing 0.005% -0.18% 
Mining 0.015% -1.47% 
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4. EFFECT OF TARIFF LIBERALIZATION ON MEXICO’S INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION IN THE PRESENCE OF MIGRATION 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Globalization has opened markets to products and services often through international 
agreements that facilitate trade. While economists generally agree that trade can deliver benefits to 
an economy, the distribution of those benefits is in question (Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2004). 
One of the critiques of globalization is that by benefiting some regions and workers more than 
others, globalization may accentuate economic inequality, and induce greater mobility of people 
(Anzaldo Gómez, Hernández Esquivel, & Rivera Vázquez, 2008).  
A number of studies shed light on the impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality in 
Mexico.24 Nicita (The price effect of tariff liberalization: Measuring the impact on household 
welfare, 2009) shows that the benefits of trade have not spread to all households and have primarily 
gone to more skilled workers, especially in Mexican states close to the U.S. border. 25 Similarly, 
Hanson (2007) and Baylis, et al. (2012) find that Northern states, which have greater access to the 
US market than the Southern states, benefit more from trade by obtaining higher prices because of 
lower transportation costs, which translates into higher labor income.  One disadvantage of these 
papers is that they do not take into account that households may respond to variations in labor 
demand by changing the type of labor they sell, or by relocating.26 The distribution of benefits from 
NAFTA will presumably not only accrue to those already working in export industries and/or living 
in regions close to the U.S. border, but also to those who can more easily migrate into those regions 
and sectors.  Conversely, those people who face higher barriers to migration may be penalized by 
                                                 
24
 Some of them are Esquivel, et al. (Technology, Trade, and Wage Inequality in Mexico before and after NAFTA, 
2003); Airola (A Regional Analysis of the Impact of Trade and Foreign Direct Investment on Wages in Mexico, 1984-
2000, 2008); Cragg, et al. (Why Has Wage Dispersion Grown in Mexico? Is It the Incidence of Reforms or the Growing 
Demand for Skills?, 1996); Feenstra, et al. (Globalization, Outsourcing, and Wage Inequality, 1996); Feliciano (Workers 
and Trade Liberalization: The Impact of Trade Reforms in Mexico on Wages and Employment, 2001); Hanson (What 
Has Happened to Wages in Mexico since NAFTA? Implications for Hemispheric Free Trade, 2003); Hanson, et al. 
(Trade, Technology, and Wage Inequality, 1995); Revenga (Employment and wage effects of trade liberalization: the case 
of Mexican manufacturing, 1997); Robertson (Trade and Wages:Two Puzzles from Mexico, 2007); Chiquiar (Why 
Mexico’s regional income convergence broke down, 2005). 
25 Robertson (2007) finds that the expansion of assembly activities in Mexico has increased the demand for less-skilled workers, and Chiquiar (2005) finds that physical capital and 
infrastructure are the main reasons why Northern Mexican states reaped the benefits from trade liberalization more than the Southern states. While insightful, these papers do not 
explicitly analyze the distribution of gains across income levels and geographical regions. 
26 For example, Hanson (Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in Mexico, 2007) assumes that “labor is sufficiently immobile across regions of Mexico for region-specific labor-
demand to affect regional differentials in labor income” (pg. 419). 
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the kind of structural shift in the economy brought about by trade. Failure to account for labor 
migration may result in an over-estimation of the growth income in the region receiving migrants, 
since 3.98 million Mexicans (4% of the total population in 2000) and five percent of working age 
men migrated from one state to another between 1995 and 2000 (Vega, 2005). (INEGI, Catálogo de 
Entidades, municipios y localidades, 2008)27. Most of these migrants are workers coming from the 
Southern states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, Veracruz, Puebla and Hidalgo (SEDESOL, 2004). The 
recipient states are in the North—mainly Sinaloa, Sonora, Baja California, and Baja California Sur 
(see Figure 7)—. By exclusively looking at growth within a region, one will overestimate the benefits 
going to the pre-existing residents and estimate a higher increase in income disparity in Mexico as a 
result of NAFTA. To correct this problem, this research proposes to measure the effects of trade 
liberalization on income distribution while taking labor migration into account. 
The results of this research can help identify those barriers facing individuals and regions that 
limit their ability to benefit from trade. Thus, this research can help detecting the areas of social 
investment and infrastructure investment28 that may help smooth wage inequality. Further, by 
identifying those regions and individuals who have benefited and lost from trade, this information 
can be used to target compensation. Furthermore, using this estimation approach, regional 
governments can anticipate migration and wages in their region, and adjust local development plans 
accordingly.   
To study the effect of NAFTA on migration I first predict the probability to migrate based on 
the potential growth in regional GVA associated with tariff reductions from NAFTA. Because 
migration and wage outcomes are jointly determined, and likely both related to unobservable 
individual characteristics, I instrument for migration using crop yield shocks, which have been 
shown to influence migration (Feng, Krueger, & Oppenheimer, 2010) yet are unlikely to affect 
wages in the manufacturing, retail or service sectors in urban areas except through labor supply. By 
analyzing trade openness and distance to the border, I find that workers closer to the US-Mexico 
border get a higher wage than their counterparts far away. But this spread diminishes as tariffs 
reduce, after NAFTA. Also, there is a slight increase in migration in the years after NAFTA. 
                                                 
27
 Between 1985 and 1990 the interstate migration was 6% and for 2005 to 2010 was 4%. 
28 Following (Costa-i-Font & Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2005) I divide the public investment into social & 
infrastructure investments. The social investment goes to areas such as health education whereas the 
infrastructure goes to areas such as: transportation, and telecommunication. 
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Further, I find that men with low incomes get a boost from the NAFTA in their wages while 
NAFTA has a negative effect for those with high incomes. Thus, trade liberalization appears to have 
decreased income disparities. 
This chapter has the following potential contributions: First, to my knowledge, this is one of the 
first studies to consider the effect of income distribution while explicitly controlling for migration.  
Second, I correct for the potential endogeneity of internal migration and wages by using a two stage 
least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable estimation. Third, by comparing low vs. high income 
earners, I explore which workers gained and lost from trade. Fourth, I include the latest population 
census (2010) to observe if, after fifteen years of NAFTA, income disparity has increased in Mexico, 
or whether as the economy adapts to trade, inequalities decrease. These results will contribute to the 
literature by clarifying the effect that trade openness has on the distribution of gains across income 
levels and geographic regions, taking internal migration into account. 
Figure 7: Net Migration by state, 1995-2000 
 
Source: CONAPO, with information from INEGI’s 2000 Population Census (Vega, 2005, p. 17). 
 
4.2. Motivation 
 
Developing countries, such as Brazil, China, India and Mexico, have experienced rapid economic 
growth. They have made significant policy adjustments to foster globalization, including lowering 
tariffs and other trade barriers, reducing barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI) and entering 
into complex trade agreements. The main motivation for these changes was the promise of growth, 
higher wages, and lower income inequality (Robertson, 2007; Harrison, 2007). While increased trade 
may have benefited the Mexican economy, some initial evidence shows that NAFTA may have 
worsened inequality in Mexico (Baylis, Garduño-Rivera, & Piras, 2012; Nicita, 2009).   
Positive 
Negative 
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Trade can affect income disparity across skills, sectors and regions.  The Heckscher-Ohlin model 
of trade states that countries should benefit overall from trade, and in particular, low-skilled labor 
should reap higher wages in developing countries where such labor is abundant.  If inputs are not 
completely mobile across sectors and regions, we would further expect factors employed in the 
export-oriented sectors to benefit more than those in import-competing industries.  Further, we 
might expect those regions with lower transport costs to export markets to benefit more which, if 
labor is not freely mobile, may either improve or exacerbate wage inequality depending on whether 
those same regions were relatively high or low income before trade.  
A number of papers provide evidence of an increase in wage inequality in Mexico after 
NAFTA29. For example, Nicita (2004) finds that the effect of trade liberalization has been almost 
exclusively transferred to skilled workers, and has increased the gap between the remuneration of 
skilled and unskilled jobs.30 As noted above, Hanson (Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in 
Mexico, 2007) and Nicita (The price effect of tariff liberalization: Measuring the impact on 
household welfare, 2009) also show that trade primarily benefited certain skills and regions in 
Mexico.. 
New Economic Geography also generates predictions about which regions might reap the gains 
from trade. The economic effects of trade may increase the concentration of economic activity in 
certain regions more than others (Krugman P. , Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 
1991). This concentration generates increased labor demand in these regions and their sectors, which 
results in increasing wages in these markets. Other effects of trade such as skill-biased technological 
change, modifications in industry-specific wage premiums, foreign investment, quality upgrading, 
skill scarcity, exchange rate and demographic changes have all been suggested as being more 
accurate explanations for the increase in wage inequality (Robertson, Trade and Wages:Two Puzzles 
from Mexico, 2007; Ranjan, 2008). 
Mexico’s trade liberalization, via NAFTA, has caused important changes in regional economic 
growth, exacerbating the disparities between the North and South of Mexico which have existed 
since industrialization began in the 1930s (López Malo, 1960; Hanson G. H., 2007; Baylis, Garduño-
                                                 
29
 For example, see Esquivel, et al., 2003; Airola, 2008; Cragg, et al., 1996; Feenstra, et al., 1996; Feliciano, 2001; Hanson, 
2003; Hanson, et al., 1995; Revenga, 1997; Robertson, 2007; Chiquiar, 2005. 
30 Nicita (2004) finds that unskilled workers in the Southern and Northern agricultural regions have suffered 
because trade liberalization has produced a decline in the prices of agricultural products, which has 
contributed to the widening gap in the remunerations between skilled and unskilled individuals. 
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Rivera, & Piras, 2012).  The regional distribution of poverty is illustrated in Figure 8. Here we 
observe the poverty headcount, which is the share of people living on less than $2.00 USD per 
person per day (Walton & Lopez-Acevedo, 2004). The darker colors denote states with higher share 
of people living on less than $2 dollars per person per day. States in the South, in dark red31, have 
76% of their people living on less than two dollars per person per day; whereas Northern states, in 
light gray32, have only 28% of their population in this situation. 
 
Figure 8: Poverty Headcount 2002 
 
 
Geography may also play a role in determining the distributions of the benefits of trade.  In the 
case of Mexico, one might anticipate that, due to lower transportation costs, regions closest to the 
U.S. border, which also tend to be wealthier, might stand to gain from trade. Similarly, those regions 
with pre-existing export-industries, such as the Northern manufacturing centers, would likely benefit 
the most from trade (Rostow, The Stages of Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 1960). Further, 
the urban labor market will benefit more than workers in rural regions because of their higher 
reliance on skilled wages, whereas rural labor tends to work more in agriculture, and often consumes 
most of what they produce (Nicita, 2009). Thus we may expect increasing inter-regional wage 
disparities which may induce migration.  
                                                 
31 Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Chiapas 
32 The Baja Californias (Norte and Sur), Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Sinaloa, Durango 
and Zacatecas. 
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There is a growing literature on the effect of migration on wages in Mexico, primarily focused on 
the effect of international labor movement.  Mishra (2007) finds that “emigration has a strong and 
positive effect on Mexican wages due to changes in local labor supply” (pg. 180). Unger (2005) also 
finds a positive link between migration and local development, working through remittances. Aroca 
and Maloney (2005) find that trade and FDI slow migration, in the sense that increased linkages to 
global markets decrease the incentive to emigrate. However, if trade affects different regions within 
a country differently, it might induce internal migration, making benefits from trade available 
primarily to those households who can move (Garduño-Rivera, Regional Economic analysis of 
Internal Migration in Mexico, 2011). 
 
4.3. Methodology 
 
This chapter estimates a model analyzing the impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality 
while controlling for labor migration. To account for an endogeneity problem between wages and 
migration, I estimate the wage equation using two-stage least squares (2SLS).  
In the first stage, I predict the probability of migration. To capture trade openness, I include the 
measures of the GVA in period t-1 (       ), from the state where the person lived 5 years ago
33, 
multiplied by the change in tariffs (    . This interaction term captures the potential growth or 
contraction in regional GVA associated with a reduction in tariffs (           ). I also include 
the measures of GVA for four different sectors (commerce, manufacturing, services and mining) in 
period t-1 (        ), from the region where the person lived 5 years ago multiplied, to capture the 
effect of the economy on migration and wages. To predict migration, Sahota (An Economic 
Analysis of Internal Migration in Brazil, 1968) uses the geographical distance from capital of region 
k to capital of region j. I instead use distance from the capital of each region to the closest U.S. 
border-crossing point         , from the region where the person lived 5 years ago since economic 
opportunities provided by NAFTA will be greater closer to the U.S. border, due to the accessibility 
to markets (Hanson G. , Localization economies, vertical organization, and trade, 1996). I control 
for characteristics of the household, the source and destination municipalities.  Following Feng, et al. 
                                                 
33 For the 1990’s census, INEGI only asked the state were the person was living in 5 years ago but not the 
municipality.  
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(Linkages among climate change, crop yields and Mexico–US cross-border migration, 2010), I use 
negative changes in crop yields as an instrumental variable to predict people’s migration responses. I 
calculate negative changes in crop yield (negative shocks) as yields below one standard deviation 
from the mean. These negative changes in crop yields work as a good instrument because it 
influences migration out-flows (Feng, Krueger, & Oppenheimer, 2010), without being correlated 
with non-agricultural wages in urban areas. I create a pooled cross-section of individuals in all 
municipalities over 3 years (1990, 2000 and 2010). The complete migration function is: 
Equation 6 
                                                                            
where 
     = 1 if individual i migrated within Mexico; 0 otherwise 
     = % change on Tariff from t-1 to t for sending region 
        = Total GVA in real 2003 Mexican pesos for sending region 
         = GVA in Manufacturing/Mining/Services/Commerce sector in real 2003 Mexican 
pesos for sending region 
       = Road distance (in thousands of kilometers) from the capital of sending region i to 
the closest U.S. border crossing point  
        = Vector of individual characteristics (i.e. education, age, and household head) 
   = Vector of household characteristics in time t (i.e. electricity, # of people, water, 
and drainage) 
       = Vector of sending state characteristics for individual i, in time t-1 
     = Sum of the number of negative changes in crop yields in the last 5 years in the 
sending region34 for individual i, in time t 
 
In a second stage, following Nicita (The price effect of tariff liberalization: Measuring the impact 
on household welfare, 2009), I estimate a wage function based on individual data, as a function of 
trade-related, demographic and household characteristics and the instrumented probability of 
                                                 
34 Since there is no data for crop yield in 1990 and 2010, we use crop yield for 1991 and 2009, respectively. 
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migration for individual i. Similar to Nicita, I include control variables such as age, years of 
education, gender of the worker, and status as household head. I run the regression for separate 
segments of income to analyze the effect that trade openness had on income distribution. I define 
the segment of low income earners by separating out those individuals earning one standard 
deviation lower than the mean wage or less for each year. In the same way, the high income segment 
is defined as those people earning more than one standard deviation greater than the mean wage for 
each year. The wage function is 
 
Equation 7 
                                                                           ̂   
where 
     = Observed wage of individual i   
 ̂    =instrumented probability to migrate 
 
To capture trade openness, I include the measures of the GVA for four different sectors 
(commerce, manufacturing, services and mining) in period t-1 (        ) multiplied by the change 
in tariffs in the respective sector (     . This interaction term captures the potential growth or 
contraction in regional GVA associated with a reduction in tariffs (             ). 
I use data on individual level wages, individual and household characteristics, as well as regional 
level data in terms of economic growth, education, migration, and other characteristics, to determine 
regional income disparities throughout Mexico.  
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
4.4. Data 
 
I use the 1990, 2000 and 2010 micro-sample of the Population Census, collected by the National 
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), which provides household level data of the Mexican 
population. These data create a cross-section across time data that spans the introduction of 
NAFTA. The variables used are described below. 
Migration     : Migration data come from the 1990, 2000 and 2010 Population Censuses from a 
question that asks in what state (or municipality) the interviewee resided five years earlier. Though 
this approach might be standard, these data have the drawback of failing to count migrants who 
might have left and returned over the five-year period.  
GVA sectors: To capture trade openness, I include the measurements of the GVA for four 
different sectors (commerce, manufacturing, services, and mining) in period t-1 for the origin and 
destination areas. These data were obtained from the INEGI’s economic censuses. 
% Change in Tariffs     : Trade openness was not the same across all sectors. Some sectors 
reduced tariffs faster than others, making these sectors grow faster than the others (Aguayo-Tellez, 
Airola, & Juhn, 2010). Therefore, to identify the effect that NAFTA had on wages and internal 
migration through trade openness, I use the different tariffs available for the different sectors. These 
data were obtained from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC). I use the data 
available, with an annual frequency, of the U.S. tariffs on Mexican exports at the 1-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) level for the light/heavy manufactured, mining and intermediate 
goods, which I matched to the manufacturing, mining and commerce sectors, respectively.  
Transportation cost (distF): I consider that economic growth will be correlated with transportation 
cost to the U.S. border, which I proxy with the road distance (measured in thousands of kilometers) 
from the region of origin to the closest U.S. border crossing point. To create the border distance 
variable, distF, I first obtain the name of the municipality or state capitals (INEGI, 2008). Second, I 
calculate the road distance from each of the municipality or states capitals to the different U.S. 
border crossing points, by entering the destination and origin points in the webpage “Traza tu Ruta” 
provided by the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes (2008). Finally, I chose the shortest 
distance for each municipality or state capital from the different distances provided by each border 
crossing point. For municipality capitals that do not appear as origin points, I calculate the distance 
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of the nearest available city or town and add the road distance from that point to the district capital 
of interest, which I calculate manually by using a map of Mexico. 
Infrastructure (Infrastructure): Investment in infrastructure provided by the local governments plays 
an important role in the migration decision and wage since people tend to migrate from places with 
low levels of infrastructure and to places with high levels of infrastructure. Therefore, I include the 
percentage of households with water, electricity and sewage from the region where the person lived 
5 years ago. This information was obtained from the INEGI’s population censuses. 
Population density (Pop.Density): Greenwood (International Migration in Developed Countries, 1997) 
mentions that migration is directly related to the population size of the origin places. Thus, I control 
for the population size from the region where the person lived 5 years ago, since regions with larger 
concentrations of people will tend to have more out-migration. In this case I use the population 
density (population per squared kilometer) that districts and states report, including children and 
elderly, in every population census. 
Individual Characteristics 
Age:  For this study I consider only males of working age (18 to 65 years), because  I see a large 
increase in labor force participation of women from 1990 to 2000, which I would have difficulty 
controlling for; whereas 78% and 80% of men of working age were participating in the labor force 
in 1990 and 2000, respectively. Hanson (Globalization, Labor Income, and Poverty in Mexico, 2007) 
and Nicita (The price effect of tariff liberalization: Measuring the impact on household welfare, 
2009) also work with the working-age male population due to the same problem. Hanson explains 
that female participation in the labor force is low and varies considerably across time. He further 
argues that including women creates a sample selection problem since many of them report zero 
labor earnings but may work in family businesses or family farms35. The age effect is approximated 
by a quadratic function. Here I expect that the older the person, the less their probability to migrate 
but the higher their income.  
Education: Education is the stock of productive skills and technical knowledge embodied in labor. 
Mexico has a competitive advantage in unskilled labor-intensive goods. Then the effect of the 
education variables will be: 
  
    
  . That means, more education will provide higher income.   
                                                 
35
 For a deeper analysis of the problems caused by including working age women  population see also Borjas, et. al. 
(Imperfect substitution between immigrants and natives: a reappraisal, 2008) 
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Literacy: These data comes from the 1990, 2000 and 2010 Population Censuses from a question 
that asks whether the interviewee can read and write. Literacy is important because immigrants tend 
to have little formal education (Camarota, 2001).  
 
4.5. Hypotheses 
 
The literature identifies that trade liberalization has increased economic growth, but affected the 
distribution of gains across income levels and geographic regions. However, these effects are 
confounded by a third important factor: migration. If all workers are completely mobile, then an 
increase in inequality among regions or sectors does not imply an increase in overall wage inequality 
and instead just reflects a change in the distribution of jobs.  Failure to account for migration may 
result in an over-estimation of income in the region receiving migrants and therefore an 
overestimation of the inequality of income distribution. In this chapter, I identify the effect of trade 
on income inequality, taking labor migration into consideration.  Since migration will not be equally 
available to all households, understanding who can and who does migrate goes to understanding 
which households are more likely to benefit from or be hurt by trade. 
The objective of this chapter is to analyze how migration patterns and incomes change from 1990 
to 2010. The main research question is: Did NAFTA increase wage inequality, taking internal 
migration into account? Combining the New Economic Geography (NEG) and the standard trade 
theory, I obtain the following testable hypotheses: 
1. Over the past decades, trade openness has caused a substantial increase in income inequality in 
Mexico (Esquivel & Rodríguez-López, Technology, Trade, and Wage Inequality in Mexico 
before and after NAFTA, 2003). This effect will be observed by having a positive effect between 
trade openness and wage for the high income group and/or a negative effect of trade openness 
on the low income group.  
 
2. The wage increases have been almost exclusively transferred to workers especially in Mexican 
states close to the U.S. border, increasing the income disparity (Nicita, The price effect of tariff 
liberalization: Measuring the impact on household welfare, 2009).This hypothesis can be tested 
by observing the sign on the coefficient on distance in the regression on worker wage. 
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3. People who migrate are able to obtain more remunerative and secure employment opportunities 
than those people who did not migrate (Morrison, Raju, & Sinha, 2007; Finan, Sadoulet, & de 
Janvry, 2005). This hypothesis can be tested by observing the coefficient on migration in the 
regression on wage. 
 
4.6. Results 
 
1st Stage—Whole Working Age Male Population 
In the first stage I regress the probability of migration against drivers associated with trade.  Table 
12 reports the probit regression results from the first stage for the probability of migration. Column 
1 shows the regression for the whole working age male population, where most variables are 
significant at the 1% level. To capture the effect of trade openness on the probability of migration, I 
use the interaction variables of the GVA with the change in tariff                and the distance 
from the border with the change in tariff and the GVA (                  ). Table 13 shows 
the marginal effect of the change in tariff. I find that a one percent decrease in the change in in 
tariffs decreases the probability to migrate by 0.3%. All of the variables of the sectoral GVA are 
significant, but their signs are different. While an increase in commerce GVA reduced the 
probability of migration, an increase in manufacturing, mining and service GVA significantly 
increases it. 
I find that literacy and years of education are significant for migration.  But while literacy reduces 
migration, years of education increases it. I also find that marginal effect of distance to the border on 
migration is significant. I also find that distance to the border and the interaction of distance with 
GVA and changes in tariff have a positive significant effect on migration. Overall, the marginal 
effect of distance is that a thousand kilometers away from the border increases the probability to 
migrate by 11% (see Table 13). 
I test for endogeneity of migration using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and get a χ2 of 63.22 (p-
value=0.00). Thus, I can reject the null hypothesis that migration is exogenous and conclude that it 
is endogenous. I also test for over identifying restrictions. In this test I get a χ2 of 0.43 (p-
value=0.51). Then, I do not reject the overidentifying restrictions and can conclude that the 
overidentifying restriction is valid. 
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2nd Stage 
Overall, the coefficients on the core variables are generally statistically significant and with the 
predicted signs (Table 14). The first column shows the result of the second stage regressions of the 
whole working age male population. Columns 2 and 3 show the result only for working age 
population for the low and high income, respectively. Table 15 shows the marginal effects of a change 
in tariffs and distance to the border. Next I explore each of these results. 
Whole Working Age Male Population 
To capture the effect of trade openness, I use the interaction variable of the GVA with the 
change in tariff               . I find that this interaction variable is significant. Thus, a one 
percent decreases in the change in GVA induced by a change in tariffs decreases the wage overall, 
particularly it decreases the wage by 3% (see Table 15). The coefficient indicates that the larger the 
traded sector in that region, the lower the wage. Most of the variables of the sectoral GVA are 
significant, but their signs are different. While an increase in commerce and mining GVA increase 
the average wage, higher manufacturing and service GVA will actually reduce their average wage. 
While this result shows that trade openness decreases wages, it does not show the effect that trade 
openness has on income inequality. For that reason I split the data into high and low income 
individuals in the following section.  
I find that literacy is negative and significant but years of education are positive and significant 
for average wages. Literacy, by itself, is not beneficial for the employees but the number of years of 
education does help to improve wages. I also find that distance to the border and the interaction of 
distance with GVA and changes in tariff have a negative significant effect on wages. Overall, the 
marginal effect of distance is that a thousand kilometers away from the border decreases the average 
wage by 4% (see Table 15). This marginal effect reduces after NAFTA since the interaction variables 
                   reduces the overall effect as tariffs reduce with trade openness. This 
evidence rejects my second hypothesis that, following Nicita’s (2009) findings, the effect of NAFTA 
has been almost exclusively transferred to workers especially in Mexican states close to the US-
Mexico border, increasing regional income disparity.  
Low Vs. High Income 
When I divide the data between high and low income men, I find that the potential effect of 
NAFTA is negative for high income but positive for low income (see Table 15). While high income 
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workers loose an 8% decrease on their wages for a 1% decrease in tariffs, low income workers gain a 
2% increase. This result rejects the first hypothesis that trade openness has increased income 
inequality because it has benefited low but not high income people, thereby decreasing the income 
disparity.  
Moving to the third hypothesis, I observe that high income workers who migrate do not do well 
with respect to their final wages whereas low income workers who migrate do improve their wages.  
Thus, we see two types of migrants, a low skilled worker migrating to occupy a better income jobs 
and high skilled migrant workers that get lower paid jobs. This evidence agrees with the third 
hypothesis, but only for low income people, because low income people who migrate end up in 
higher paying jobs than those who do not, on average over the whole country. This result supports 
Morrison et al. (2007) findings that poor households prevent and mitigate risk by migrating to 
locations with more remunerative and secure employment opportunities. 
 
4.7. Conclusions 
 
This chapter explores the factors that influence Mexico’s regional income differentials and the 
effect of NAFTA, taking internal migration into account. I use data on individual level wages, 
individual and household characteristics, as well as regional level data in terms of economic growth, 
education, migration, and other characteristics, to determine regional income disparities throughout 
each Mexican region. Thus, this study sheds light on the effect of trade openness on individual and 
wage inequalities. 
This research provides initial evidence of the effect of trade liberalization on income inequality, 
suggesting that trade liberalization has reduced income inequalities, leading to a smaller regional 
polarization. Men with lower income benefited more from NAFTA than those with higher income, 
indicating a decrease in income disparity. The potential effect of NAFTA on migration is also 
stronger with low income people than with high income people, because low income workers are 
more sensitive to migrate, especially those that worked in traded sectors in the same region where 
the worker lived 5 years ago. Also, large traded sectors induced migration, particularly for the poor, 
and offered a higher wage overall, which results in an increase in income inequality because it has 
only benefited workers in traded sectors but not in non-traded sectors.  
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The effects of trade liberalization, such as regional transportation benefits, have slightly increased 
migration towards the US-Mexico border. This evidence conforms with Krugman & Livas-Elizondo 
(1996) finding that trade leads to more migration because the U.S. market appears to be increasing in 
importance.  
While workers close to the U.S. market have a higher wage, workers far away from the United 
States are receiving a lower income. This spread reduces over time as tariff decreases. However, 
north-south disparities are only one part of the story.  I find that large manufacturing sectors seem 
to be associated with a smaller wage. This implies that because trade benefits manufacturing, it 
decreases income disparity.  
Potential policy implications of this study are that investment in manufacturing can be used as 
means to ease regional wage inequality. This evidence also suggests that policies that facilitate 
internal migration will be good for economic growth and will reduce income inequality.  However it 
is important to mention, that those policies should have a broad access to make sure it reaches all 
the household and regions. In this way, it will avoid increasing inequality among households and 
regions.   
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4.8. Tables 
Table 12: 1st stage—2SLS across time: P(Migrate). Significance levels: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
All Low Income High Income 
                -2.19e-11 2.53e-10** -2.21e-10* 
 
(-1.79) (3.13) (-2.47) 
                   -1.44e-09*** 6.98e-11 -2.66e-09*** 
 
(-13.86) (0.09) (-5.10) 
                   1.11e-09*** 1.10e-09** 1.62e-09*** 
 
(21.04) (2.98) (7.06) 
                   5.06e-11*** 7.76e-11 1.25e-10 
 
(6.21) (1.43) (1.90) 
                   3.69e-10*** 2.42e-10* 3.00e-10** 
 
(22.20) (2.06) (3.24) 
Literacy -0.0127*** -0.00480 -0.0229*** 
 (-14.67) (-1.40) (-3.83) 
Education 0.00209*** 0.00157*** 0.00442*** 
 (49.04) (5.74) (22.32) 
       0.111*** -0.0443 0.0581** 
 (18.92) (-1.03) (2.75) 
                   3.12e-11* -3.07e-10*** -8.28e-11 
 (2.38) (-3.45) (-1.11) 
    -0.000824** 0.00316 0.00223 
 
(-2.64) (1.83) (1.37) 
Age -0.000755*** 0.00157*** -0.000469 
 (-8.17) (3.63) (-0.74) 
Age^2 -0.00000149 -0.0000250*** -0.0000174* 
 (-1.34) (-4.78) (-2.38) 
Married -0.000954* 0.00192 -0.00370 
 (-2.24) (0.75) (-1.30) 
 
 
  Indigenous Lang. 0.0164*** 0.00480 -0.00147 
 (18.23) (1.39) (-0.24) 
 
 
  Infrastructuret-1 -0.0675*** -0.00631 -0.0240*** 
 (-61.86) (-0.89) (-4.38) 
Pop.Densityt-1 0.0000916*** 0.0000677*** 0.0000606*** 
 (54.19) (6.18) (8.67) 
Working Hours 0.000320*** 0.0000288 0.000262*** 
 
(31.04) (0.73) (4.71) 
Owner -0.000850 0.0145 -0.0203*** 
 
(-0.89) (1.57) (-8.52) 
Labor force participation rate -2.491*** -0.565* -1.795*** 
 (-61.83) (-2.29) (-9.60) 
    x2000 0.0924*** -0.0281 0.0484*** 
 
(38.47) (-1.83) (4.15) 
    x2010 0.175*** -0.0164 0.0635*** 
 
(49.26) (-0.70) (3.48) 
    Constant 1.190*** 0.320* 0.934*** 
 
(56.68) (2.51) (9.92) 
    N 3,798,578 107,301 148,688 
R-sq 0.226 0.173 0.195 
Adjusted R-sq 0.270 0.211 0.264 
 
Table 13 Marginal Effect of Change in Tariffs and Distance for P(Migrate). 
Marginal 
Effect 
Migration 
All Low High 
    0.3% -0.5% -2.2% 
       11% 1% 6% 
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Table 14: 2nd stage 2SLS across time: Ln(Wage). Significance levels: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
All Low Income High Income 
                1.20e-09*** -2.56e-09*** 7.80e-10*** 
 
(18.20) (-17.08) (6.14) 
                   3.85e-09*** 3.02e-09*** 8.03e-09*** 
 
(11.90) (5.27) (11.91) 
                   -1.05e-09*** -2.10e-09*** -7.56e-10** 
 
(-8.30) (-9.38) (-2.75) 
                   2.61e-10*** -2.13e-10** 5.90e-10*** 
 
(8.03) (-2.65) (5.06) 
                   -2.77e-10*** -7.73e-10*** 1.37e-09*** 
 
(-3.64) (-5.48) (8.82) 
Literacy -0.0973*** 0.0426*** -0.168*** 
 (-14.67) (5.78) (-4.77) 
Education 0.0706*** -0.00294*** -0.0327*** 
 (238.66) (-5.49) (-47.93) 
       -0.0585*** 0.143*** -0.0375* 
 (-5.99) (6.48) (-2.13) 
                   -9.14e-10*** 2.11e-09*** 5.44e-11 
 (-15.23) (13.94) (0.49) 
 ̂  0.0138 0.0991** -0.0777** 
 
(1.08) (2.83) (-2.69) 
Age 0.0726*** 0.0116*** -0.0391*** 
 (103.04) (12.91) (-20.99) 
Age^2 -0.000819*** -0.000169*** 0.000445*** 
 (-88.00) (-15.05) (20.26) 
Married 0.204*** 0.100*** -0.130*** 
 (79.01) (20.40) (-18.69) 
    Indigenous Lang. -0.149*** -0.0190*** 0.00697 
 (-27.94) (-3.90) (0.35) 
    Infrastructuret-1 -0.0194*** 0.0743*** -0.104*** 
 (-7.80) (16.96) (-16.75) 
Pop.Densityt-1 -0.0000335*** -0.0000167 -0.000121*** 
 (-8.54) (-1.83) (-14.35) 
Working Hours 0.00741*** 0.000273*** -0.00236*** 
 
(97.61) (3.91) (-16.24) 
Owner 0.539*** -0.0473*** -0.0584*** 
 
(74.92) (-3.98) (-8.55) 
Labor force participation rate 0.729*** -2.773*** 1.439*** 
 (7.86) (-18.09) (6.69) 
    x2000 -0.513*** -0.832*** -1.534*** 
 
(-94.76) (-75.48) (-104.16) 
    x2010 0.254*** -0.753*** -1.118*** 
 
(31.56) (-56.87) (-60.88) 
    Constant 5.079*** 1.641*** 12.83*** 
 
(104.08) (20.52) (107.03) 
    N 3,798,578 107,301 148,688 
R-sq 0.148 0.369 0.444 
adj. R-sq 0.148 0.369 0.443 
 
 
Table 15 Marginal Effect of Change in Tariffs and Distance for Ln(Wage). 
Marginal 
Effect 
Wage 
All Low High 
    3% -2% 8% 
       -4% 11% -4% 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Economists generally agree that trade has a positive effect on overall economic growth in a 
country. However, trade also affects the location of economic activity, migration and the distribution 
of wages. Overall Mexico has been expected to benefit from its lower labor costs, the physical 
proximity of its border regions implies that northern Mexico has a geographic advantage in 
production for the U.S. market, and may benefit more than other regions from the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  Empirical evidence testing how NAFTA affected the north-
south disparity has previously shown mixed results. 
NAFTA plays a valuable role in regional distribution of benefits in Mexico. The NAFTA 
benefited primarily the wealthier northern states of Mexico due to their proximity to the U.S. 
market, while other regions did not gain any benefit from it. In this dissertation I have shown the 
various impacts of NAFTA in the regional economics of Mexico. In Essay 1, we demonstrate that 
trade liberalization has not reduced territorial disparities, but rather led to a greater regional 
polarization. We have also shown that NAFTA benefits those regions with poorer infrastructure, 
decreasing the gap between regions with higher levels of drainage and electricity and those without. 
We have seen evidence that NAFTA also lowered the gap between regions with high rates of high 
school education and those without. Thus, it appears as if NAFTA did have some redistributive 
effect. 
In Essay 2, I have shown that trade openness has increased internal migration, but this effect 
diminishes over time, confirming that much of the trade-generated migration happened after Mexico 
joined the GATT. The flow of migrants to the United States has increased due to the pull caused by 
the U.S. economy over the transportation cost to get to the United States, especially in the years 
following the NAFTA agreement. Thus, there is evidence of a “hump” of migration to the United 
States, as the large number of Mexicans displaced by economic restructuring led temporarily to more 
migration.  This is consistent with the results in Essay 1 that indicate that the wealthier northern 
states will benefit more increasing their economic activity, which, as a result, attracted more labor to 
this region. In addition, urban-rural migration has also increased because most of the low skill 
workers are leaving the rural and arriving to the urban regions. Places with higher levels of 
infrastructure will attract workers since this will provide a better standard of living. 
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In Essay 3, I presented initial evidence of the effect of trade liberalization on income inequality. I 
have shown that trade liberalization has reduced income inequalities. The potential effect of 
NAFTA on migration is also stronger with low income people than with high income, because low 
income workers are more inclined to migrate, especially those who worked in traded sectors in the 
same region where the worker lived 5 years ago. Also, large traded sectors induced migration, 
particularly for the poor, and a higher wage overall, which results in increased income inequality 
since it only benefited workers in traded sectors.  
The effects of trade liberalization, such as regional transportation benefits, have slightly increased 
migration towards the US-Mexico border. While Mexican municipalities close to the U.S. market 
have profited from integration by increasing their incomes, regions further away from the United 
States have become more disconnected from Mexico's integration into world markets. This evidence 
conforms with findings in the first two essays that trade leads to more migration since the U.S. 
market appears to be increasing in importance, whereas the domestic market represented by Mexico 
City is perhaps less important after NAFTA.  
As an economist myself, I recognized that we have contributed to the exaltation of the ability of 
trade openness in a country to create regional economic growth and improve the welfare of the 
society. Although many studies confirmed the benefits of trade openness; the wide variability of 
these estimates has brought doubts of the economic gains of trade. These may have emerged due to 
the limitation of the scope of these analyses.  
Even though centrifugal forces are starting to function, better policies will be needed to control 
the increase in regional disparities. Industrial, educational, and regional development policies must 
be quickly developed to set up the foundations for growth in all regions. Potential policy 
implications are that investment in manufacturing and policies that facilitate internal migration will 
be good for economic growth and will reduce income inequality.  However it is important to 
mention that those policies should have broad access to ensure that they reach all the household and 
regions. In this way, it will avoid increasing inequality among households and regions. Further 
research is necessary to determine what other factors influence regional growth in Mexico. Factors 
that were previously considered fundamental in growth theory are quickly giving way to different 
and less known factors that are likely to shape the next phase of Mexico’s regional development. 
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